POLICY REPORT | Evolving Frameworks of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy: Intergovernmental and Power Relations Between the National and Regional Government
- Details
- IAG Philippines
- Blog Content
- Hits: 3717
First of a seven-part roundtable discussion series on Muslim Mindanao autonomy
INTRODUCTION
One of the key issues in the on-going deliberations on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) is the intergovernmental and power relations between the national government and the regional government. Under the proposed BBL bill, the relationship will be “asymmetric.” There are powers that are reserved for the national government, those that are exclusive to the Bangsamoro and the “concurrent” powers or those that will be shared by both. The bill likewise provides for the creation of an intergovernmental relations body to be composed of representatives from the Bangsamoro government and the national government that will resolve issues on intergovernmental relations.
The main challenge for the Legislature is to determine the degree and extent of autonomy to be granted. How substantive are the powers that it will give to the Bangsamoro government? What mechanism should it put in place to ensure that the exercise of these powers is properly coordinated with the national government as well as with the local government units (LGUs)? How can the proposed BBL address the existing gaps and promote more meaningful autonomy?
Last June 18, 2015, the first roundtable discussion (RTD) on Muslim Mindanao Autonomy was held at the Senate of the Philippines and was attended by the officers and technical staff of the offices of the Senators and the Senate Secretariat. The first of a seven-part series, the RTD focused on the concepts and frameworks of peacebuilding, autonomy, decentralization, and intergovernmental relations. Resource speakers shared the international and Philippine experiences on autonomy and how its concept has evolved over time.
The RTD series was organized by the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG), the Local Government Development Foundation (LOGODEF), the Senate Muslim Advocates for Peace and Progress (SMAPP), and the Senate Economic Planning Office (SEPO). It aims to provide a venue for a non-partisan and academic discussion and dialogue on Muslim Mindanao autonomy. The RTD series seeks to foster a deeper understanding of the drivers of the diverse positions and provide a broader menu of options in addressing the contentious issues in the proposed BBL. Prepared by the SEPO, this report summarizes the highlights of the first RTD.
PRESENTATIONS
Comparative Experiences on Intergovernmental Relations
Dr. Chetan Kumar, Governance and Peacebuilding Advisor
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Dr. Kumar who worked as conflict advisor for the UNDP for over 15 years identified three broad sets of challenges encountered in other countries in dealing with movements for regional or identity-based autonomy. These are: 1) the legitimate demand for expression of identity or the right to autonomy by ethno-linguistic groups; 2) the administrative and operational relationship between the national, regional, and the local governments; and 3) the alignment of standards particularly in the management and use of land and natural resources.
Dr. Kumar cited the experience of India which, like the Philippines, has a unitary Constitution but has 29 ethno-linguistic states, the equivalent of the autonomous regions of Cordillera and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines. One-third of India’s states were created as a result of armed movements or insurgencies, 13 of which suggesting independence. One example is Chhattisgarh which was formed by splitting Madhya Pradesh, a state with an even bigger population than the Philippines, after 20 years of armed struggle by a group that wanted autonomy for that region.
According to Dr. Kumar, while the central government recognized the legitimate demand for expression of identity of the said armed group, it also had to consider that there are other groups comprising almost half of the population of the area which similarly need protection of their identity and their rights. The formidable challenge then was allowing adequate expressions of diversity and empowering the people while at the same time maintaining the unity that is crucial for national cohesion. Another difficulty was determining how to fit the new state government into an already established system. In India, there is already a well-entrenched framework of devolution. There are the Panchayats, the equivalent of barangays in the Philippines. For many years, the principle of governance in India has been progressive devolution of decision making, and of the use of finances and management of local resources and issues by the local authorities. How then will the new state government of Chhattisgarh fit into this framework? The third big issue was that of land and natural resources and how they are going to be managed in a manner that is in accordance to national standards when it comes to issues like environmental sustainability and guaranteeing certain rights and protection of minorities. One of the concerns is whether the leaders of the new state or regional government who came to prominence through armed struggle can ensure that all groups are taken into account as part of the democratic process.
To address the first issue, India took a two-fold approach, an initial and a subsequent process. It put upfront the issues of identity as part of the deliberation of the Indian parliament in the creation of a new state and incorporated it into the state law. There is an acknowledgement though that not everything can be negotiated upfront and that governance is an evolving process. Some issues which are very complex and have long histories were built into a process that would unfold over a period of several years and then taken forward by the new state entity itself. To ensure that the process happened as agreed upon at the beginning, a joint federal central state body was created to monitor and audit the progress of particular issues in the state assembly.
As for the second issue, India made sure to clearly define the fiduciary, the administrative, the operational, and the bureaucratic dimensions of the new region. Dr. Kumar explained that one feature that is common to all autonomous regions everywhere in the world especially those that reflect identity autonomy is the power of money and resources. When it comes to power of finances, without exception, the arrangement is that the national government remits or allocates finances to the state or the autonomous regional government, which then further allocates them to the local governments. In India, for example, there are 29 autonomous regions and there are about seven or eight “nationally administered territories.” There is a direct relationship between the national government and the LGUs in nationally administered territories but with the LGUs in the autonomous state, that relationship no longer exists.
However, at the same time, the national government still has an obligation to ensure equal access to resources and development to all parts of the country. There are two arenas where this can come to play. One arena is through the establishment of a mutually agreed set of governance standard protocols with the autonomous region. This could range from environmental standards to public administration to accountability in governance. As in the case of many systems where autonomy is devolved, there is a periodic governance review that is jointly undertaken by national bodies and state bodies that could be done by an independent institution, in the case of India, by its Supreme Court.
A second very important aspect is the question of what happens to the resources given to the state or to the region by the central government. What happens to the taxes collected by the state government from the local level and how is that money sent back to the LGUs for the attainment of their development objectives? It is useful to detail that process or that protocol to some degree upfront, bearing in mind that not everything can be spelled out and some have to be decided on by the state assembly going forward. It is also important to identify a point of recourse should the local government bodies feel an undue arrogation of power by the state government.
With regard to the alignment of standards, Dr. Kumar stressed that it is critical that any law establishing an autonomous unit is able to indicate forward-looking intergovernmental processes through which these issues will be discussed, and then design a framework which will be applied at both regional and local levels.
Peacebuilding-Statebuilding: Understanding theSignificance ofIntergovernmentalRelations and the Bangsamoro Initiative
Prof. Edmund Tayao, Executive Director
Local Government Development Foundation (LOGODEF)
View presentation
According to Prof. Tayao, intergovernmental relations should be looked at using a systems approach. Intergovernmental relations, he said, is a system design or a structure that shapes relations between different government offices at different levels and even between government officials and political leaders. It serves as a tool for implementation, monitoring as well as setting and complying with standards. It is primarily a means to an end, and as a means, it provides strength and character to the state.
Various studies have characterized the Philippines as a weak state. Its governance and political system is described as partisan and personality-based where popularity always trumps policy and where political dynasties are prevalent. There is an absence of peace, especially in Mindanao. While the country has a vibrant civil society, there is a confusion and a question of credibility as many of them are or have also been immersed in electoral politics. Power remains concentrated in the hands of the few and as such, competition is limited. Many say that the 1986 EDSA Revolution is actually not a revolution but simply a restoration of the old ruling class.
Needless to say, there is a need to reorganize the government into one which works as a system of institutions, where the role of individual while significant is tempered by standards. Prof. Tayao stressed that processes should matter. Short-cuts should be minimized and be replaced by a long-term approach. Nonetheless, government programs should allow some level of flexibility and should be a work of collaboration and cooperation, not competition and division.
Just like the Philippines, Spain had a problem with the concept of state. In the 1970s, Spain is a poor nation. But in 1974, it underwent a process of democratization which they called Ruptura Pactada and by 1979, already established a new constitution. Spain managed to successfully legitimate state power and authority and its main strategy was to devolve powers. Spain’s Constitution expressly states that it is not a federal system but it has 17 autonomous communities created as a result of Ruptura Pactada. In the case of the Philippines, while there was a renewal of freedoms, there was a failure to strengthen the public institutions that will accommodate these freedoms. As concluded in the study of the Asia Foundation, the Philippines vacillated (urong-sulong) with decentralization and for the most part, its implementation has been dependent on the support of the incumbent administration. The Legislature also failed to make the necessary amendments to the Local Government Code of 1991 even though the law requires its formal review every five years and if needed, a revision.
Prof. Tayao stated that from a systems point of view, the proposed BBL is an opportunity for change. It has been propounded that the Philippine state is as such because the country has not yet experienced a civil war. Establishing the Bangsamoro government, one that is a real autonomous government is an opportunity to see a working system without having to go through a violent process as in the case of other countries and without having to undergo the difficult process of Charter change. Envisaging the Bangsamoro government is strengthening the still incomplete democratization in the country. With the proposed ministerial or parliamentary government, there is an opportunity to have an entirely new political environment that can allow the development of principled political parties unlike in the current system where personalities, clans and political dynasties rule. By offering a new way to deal with governance and statebuilding, the proposed BBL is an initiative not only significant for Mindanao but for the whole country.
Intergovernmental relations is key but it is important that it be institutionalized and its authority be well-defined. There has to be a clear delineation of functions among the different levels of government, but not too rigid to be interpreted as one essentially on its own or superior to the other. As what had happened during the Yolanda disaster, a concept of subsidiarity should apply. The local government will undertake a particular responsibility but the national government should always be ready to assist, or if need be, take over especially in cases where it is impossible or difficult for the local government to operate. Second, it is important to identify areas of collaboration especially during the transition period as a way to build confidence and help strengthen institutions. A project can be identified and commonly implemented and from there, some functions may be delineated. Third, fiscal autonomy must be ensured. According to Prof. Tayao, except in the Philippines, he has yet to encounter in the academic literature of an autonomous or regional government that always goes to the central government to defend its budget. There should also be common standards when it comes to transparency and accountability. Another aspect that needs highlighting is the relevance of inclusivity and sensitivity. Putting a political color when there is none or worse, mistaking mere political color as substance will not help. Inclusivity and sensitivity are necessary for all parties to get to a good start.
In closing, Prof. Tayao expressed that the country needs a systems change. That change, however, has to start somewhere. If within the Bangsamoro government, a change can be instituted and can be learned from, the whole country will benefit.
The ARMM Experience on Autonomy
Atty. Rasol Mitmug, Chief of Staff and former Speaker
ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly
According to Atty. Mitmug, the creation of autonomous regions in the country was intended to be a peacebuilding strategy. The first autonomous region was ordained when former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1618 or the law “[i]mplementing the organization of the Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Assembly) and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook (Regional Executive Council)” in Regions IX and XII. The said decree was the result of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and was crafted so that regional peace and order would be attained in Mindanao while finding a mechanism where community-based implementation of programs and recognition of traditions can be carried out.
The establishment of the second autonomous region was mandated under the 1987 Constitution and the rationale for such is best explained in Disomangcop vs Datumanong (G.R. No. 149848, November 25, 2004). The said decision referred to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the reasons behind the creation of autonomous regions. Particularly instructive were the statements of then Commissioner Ponciano Bennagen who said that autonomy is the answer to the centuries struggle against oppression and exploitation and is a plea for national peace. Similarly, former Senator Blas Ople expressed that the Commission’s framing of the Constitution is a “heaven-sent opportunity” to recognize certain vital pragmatic needs for national peace and solidarity, and to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation in Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Devolution and decentralization based on jurisprudence
Prior to the 1987 Constitution, the decentralization of autonomous regions is merely a decentralization of administrative mandates. Atty. Mitmug explained that this was understandable because at that time, the term autonomous region does not exist in the 1973 Constitution and the concept of devolution only pertained to LGUs. PD 1618 contemplated autonomy as an arrangement where the President has the power and general supervision and control over the autonomous region while the Sangguniang Pampook, being the legislative arm, discharges only administrative services. On the other hand, under the 1987 Constitution, and based on the Disomangcop ruling which also cited the case of Limbona vs Mangilin (G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989), autonomy is already a decentralization of powers. It was viewed that “the creation of autonomous regions contemplates the grant of political autonomy—an autonomy which is greater than the administrative autonomy granted to local government units.” Further, Section 16 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides the limits of the power of the President over autonomous regions while also curtailing the power of Congress over the same. Atty. Mitmug expounded on this idea by citing Ganzon vs Court of Appeals which confirmed the diminution of Congress’ powers over the autonomous region. What is important to note is that the autonomous region was created as a special LGU and that no less than the Constitution conferred it with devolved powers. In effect, the Legislature of the autonomous region can create their own laws without interference from the national government and its legislature.
The need for intergovernmental relations
Since the autonomous region can create its own laws and rules, it is important to put in place a structure that will ensure coordination not only between the national government and the autonomous region but also among their respective bureaus and agencies.
Intergovernmental relations in the ARMM is provided for under Article V of Republic Act (RA) No. 9054, otherwise known as the ARMM Organic Act. Section 1 refers to the power of the President over the ARMM. Noteworthy is the fact that his power is only general supervision, unlike in PD 1618 where aside from supervision, he also has control over the autonomous region.
Unfortunately, most of the provisions of the ARMM Organic Act that would have facilitated intergovernmental relations are not yet fully implemented. For instance, Sections 2, 4, 5 and 7 of Article V provide for an ARMM representative in the Cabinet, in the National Government, in Executive Departments and Constitutional Bodies, and in Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs), respectively. However, these provisions are not mandatory and are exercised only “whenever practicable.” It is still largely the discretion of the national government whether or not to have the ARMM representatives on board. Thus often, the ARMM is not represented or has weak coordination with bodies that affect the region and the nation in general. A practical example is the cocolisap infestation which the ARMM has been struggling with difficulty because the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) does not have an office in the ARMM. There are many other agencies that have very weak presence in the region.
To be fair, not all failings of intergovernmental relations can be attributed to the lack of commitment from the national government. Section 3, Article V of RA 9054 provides for the coordination between the Shari’ah and the national justice systems. Until now, this is not implemented because the ARMM’s Regional Legislative Assembly has yet to enact the enabling laws.
Confusion and gaps in RA 9054
Another issue regarding the intergovernmental relations between the national government and regional government as well as its component LGUs is the confusion on the nature of autonomy granted to the ARMM. Some of the line agencies have the misconception that the ARMM is no longer part of their departments. However, in Kida vs COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that there is a Constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments. One must note though that the source of power for LGUs is the Local Government Code of 1991 while the ARMM traces its mandate from Article X of the 1987 Constitution and its Organic Act. As provided therein, the Local Government Code of 1991 can be amended anytime by Congress while the ARMM Organic Act can be amended only after a majority vote and a plebiscite (Kida). Some people are also confusing autonomous regions with administrative regions and development authorities. The former are merely groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes while the latter are only planning and coordinative bodies. They cannot pass any legislation, unlike LGUs and autonomous regions.
Atty. Mitmug stated that the devolution in the region has not been fully realized because the ARMM Oversight Committee has not yet finished its job. Under the law, there will be an oversight committee chaired by the Executive Secretary and composed of the Secretary of Budget and Management, the ARMM Regional Governor, the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly, the Chairpersons of the House and Senate Committees on Local Government, a senator designated by the Senate President and an ARMM congressional district representative designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The purpose of the oversight committee is to supervise the transfer to the ARMM of the powers and functions vested in it by the ARMM Organic Act and the appropriations of the offices or agencies, including the transfer of properties, assets, liabilities, and personnel. It also aims to identify line agencies and GOCCs that may be absorbed by the ARMM government. This devolution process was not finalized and there remain many overlapping issues with the national government. He cited as an example the taxation mechanism and the relationship between the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) and the ARMM government.
Local autonomy in the region has also become complex due to the presence of two local government codes. Before the creation of the ARMM, there is already the Local Government Code of 1991 which grants LGUs the power “to discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them”. Two years later, the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly passed the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25 or the ARMM Local Government Code. Then came RA 9054 which superseded MMA 25. Many of the LGUs within the ARMM are confused with these devolution laws and they simply choose between MMA 25 and the Local Government Code of 1991 especially when they or their partners are unfamiliar with the Pandi vs Saber Case (G.R. No. 116850, April 11, 2002).
Fundamental Issues on Intergovernmental Relations
Dean Benedicto Bacani, Executive Director
Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG)
According to Dean Bacani, a survey of the powers that were given since the 1976 Tripoli Agreement up to RA 9054 will show that there is somewhat a progression in the form of decentralization from purely a delegation of administrative powers and functions to the actual transfer of political power. However, with a myriad of issues ailing the ARMM, autonomy is widely considered as still highly imperfect. Hence, in deliberating the proposed Basic Law for the Bangsamoro, one of the main questions to consider is whether the provisions of the draft BBL that will be legislated will promote, inhibit or worsen the autonomy framework.
Under this framework, there is an abdication of the political powers of the national government in favor of the autonomous region. In the case of the Philippines, the President should only be exercising general supervision over the ARMM. The ARMM should serve as the consolidator of the powers and resources with the Regional Governor exercising supervision over the Provincial Governors. The next step is for the regional government to decentralize administration to the LGUs, which in turn will be the basic services providers to the communities. With this arrangement, there is political autonomy and when it is complete, there will actually be “self-immolation” because the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the national authorities but to its constituency.
The way the Philippines implemented decentralization in the ARMM suggests that there is something wrong with its framing of autonomy. For instance, one would expect that as the higher level of government devolves its functions and responsibilities to the one below it, there will accordingly be less fiscal resources on top and more in the bottom. In reality, while the national government devolved the functions to the regional government, the funds remained with the national line agencies.In the same manner, the ARMM failed to devolve powers to the LGUs partly because of the confusion or miscomprehension of the laws governing devolution.
In addressing these systemic weaknesses, there is a big question on whether one needs a new autonomous region or just an amendment of the existing ARMM Organic Act. According to Dean Bacani, while there is the whole issue of aspirations and self-determination symbols to consider, there is also a risk that with a totally new entity, the country might even regress in its pursuit of meaningful autonomy.
Identity and relations
A very crucial aspect of decentralization, particularly the grant of autonomy, is that it is an expression of the right to self-determination. Apart from talking about effective delivery of services, it is also addressing issues on identity, aspirations, and historical grievances. Hence, one has to assess whether the autonomous region will indeed promote greater autonomy and self-determination or simply more integration or co-optation of the Moro people into the Philippine system. Is it, as some have alleged, a pre-departure area for independence? Dean Bacani stressed that if one looks at the whole history of the ARMM, it is very clear that it is a fundamentally peacebuilding strategy. It should be kept in mind though that peacebuilding is not inconsistent with good governance. “A good and working autonomous region is also a way and a path to peace and to peace-building”, he said.
Inclusivity
Dean Bacani believes that the manner by which the Senate Committee on Local Government is studying the proposed BBL and the way it is conducting consultations promote inclusivity. The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), while very sound political documents, are still products of negotiation, and are aspirational in nature. “We have to ask ourselves the question of whether this will work or not. If only two parties are talking, how can we have that confidence that this will work if you don’t listen to all the other stakeholders?”, he remarked.
Double autonomy
One of the problems that the proposed BBL can address is the “double autonomy” in the ARMM and the other issues arising from it. Dean Bacani pointed out that LGUs prefer to implement the national Local Government Code of 1991 over the ARMM Local Government Code because the former provides a more significant source of funding by way of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). As a result, the leverage the national government has over the LGUs in the ARMM are much superior than that of the regional government. Dean Bacani emphasized that the autonomous region should evolve to a cohesive one, with the regional government and the constituent LGUs having harmonized programs. He warned that if the relationship is dysfunctional and the devolution is unclear, then this will result in the paralysis in the implementation of government functions and projects.
Dean Bacani remarked that if Congress really wants to improve its version of the draft BBL, it should shift its focus away from the constitutionality issues to those that produce a structure and process that will work in the region. He cited as an example the need to further clarify the relationship between the regional government and its constituent LGUs. In the draft BBL, this will basically be determined by the Bangsamoro parliament, with a guarantee that whatever privileges already enjoyed by the LGUs under existing laws shall not be reduced. However, the provision comes with a caveat that changes can be made “for good governance”. This brings one to ask, underwhat specific governance conditions can the privileges be altered, modified or reformed? Another related issue is the intergovernmental mechanism between the regional government and the LGUs. There is a proposal in the draft BBL that the Council of Leaders take on this responsibility. “Will the Council of Leaders be enough of a mechanism to resolve possible disputes and relationship issues among regional and LGU leaders?”, Dean Bacani asked.
Aside from causing confusion and uncertainty, not defining the relationship upfront may result in the perpetuation of the existing problems. For instance, it is not clear whether the IRA will be coursed through the Bangsamoro government or will continue to be dispensed directly to the LGUs by the national government. If the current arrangement is retained by the Bangsamoro parliament, then there will be no autonomy as the LGUs will keep on relying on the national government.
According to Dean Bacani, refinements should also be made with the proposed intergovernmental relations body between the national and regional governments. Will its function be coordinative or will it be some sort of a grievance machinery? Should it be a tripartite body of the Bangsamoro government, the Executive, and the Congress? Dean Bacani stressed that what is currently happening in the ARMM wherein the oversight committee is rarely convened should be avoided. Clarifying how the mechanism will work will also prevent coordination problems as what had happened during the Mamasapano tragedy.
Dean Bacani summarized his presentation by stating that in crafting the proposed BBL, the primary strategic goal should be how to make the autonomous arrangement work better.
OPEN FORUM AND DISCUSSIONS
Question: The ARMM has been tagged as a “failed experiment”. Is this a fair assessment? During budget hearings in the Senate, the ARMM governor is able to report encouraging developments in the region, why then do we need a BBL when one can just fully implement the provisions of the ARMM Organic Act or amend this legislation to address the weaknesses in the current system?
Dean Bacani: That the ARMM is a failed experiment is a statement made to rally support for the proposed BBL. One has to look back in time to understand why the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) wants a new Organic Act for the Bangsamoro. It is clear from history that the MILF never acknowledged the ARMM. It has been offered to them several times in many different forms—expanded, enhanced, but they have consistently rejected it because for them, it was fundamentally flawed. Even in the crafting of the draft BBL by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission which is MILF-led, it was very hard for them to look at RA 9054. Being a revolutionary organization aspiring for recognition as a people, a mere amendment of RA 9054 is unacceptable. On the other hand, it is also difficult to create political institutions out of a vacuum, unless one has just been decolonized or is establishing a new Constitution. There is also a question of capacity, of readiness, not only of the people who will govern the Bangsamoro but the capacity of Manila particularly the bureaucrats, to make the proposed BBL work.
Ideally, we should build on what is already there and reiterate the good provisions in RA 9054, otherwise they will be forever lost. But then we also have to consider the aspirations of the people we are negotiating with. That is why translating peace agreements into a legal document is really very tricky as there are so many symbols and issues (self-determination vs territorial integrity, shared sovereignty, etc.) to deal with. What is crucial though is ensuring that we are moving forward in terms of improving the autonomous arrangement that we have. The proposed BBL should hence not be less than the ARMM Organic Act, in terms of autonomy.
Dr. Kumar: We have actually encountered a similar situation in at least three other places in the world, including India where you have a functioning autonomous government but still there was an insurgency or rebellion in that area. In India, what happened was that the status of the territory was elevated from a federal territory to a state and a new law was passed, which is largely the same as what existed before but with slight changes. It was mainly a symbolic concession yet it went a long way towards addressing a need, a recognition of their difference and their identity. We should note that in peacebuilding, symbols are very important.
With the ARMM, there is an issue of deficiency of productivity, of the ability of the state to deliver to the people. There are two elements that would be crucial in the proposed BBL that take that symbolism to a higher level. One has to do with where the control over funding and resources is. That is one substantive change that can make people say that they now have the power over their own destiny. Second is the presence of an intergovernmental relations body. This is important from a symbolic perspective because to an extent, there is a recognition of parity. It is an expression of a level of respect and esteem that the national government is willing to sit down and work out all those issues with the autonomous government. Each of the 25 countries in the world that have negotiated arrangements around autonomy has a national commission with independent powers that mediates all relations between the national government and the autonomous region.
Atty. Mitmug: The statement that the ARMM is a failed experiment is actually four years late. It was made when the peace negotiation was just about to start and I think it has not been updated. However, technically, it is a failed experiment because it was not able to address the peace and order situation. We should remember that the creation of the ARMM is meant to be a peacebuilding strategy. For us in the ARMM government, the proposed BBL is an opportunity for structural and systemic changes because admittedly, even if we can run the ARMM, there is still the issue of autonomy. Fiscal autonomy, in particular, is very important as there were several instances when we had to debate with the national agencies because the program funds are with them. In terms of addressing aspirations, the proposed BBL is also better than the ARMM Organic Act. The proposed BBL is not just for the MILF, it just so happened that its crafting is led by them. But even if you take the MILF out of the picture, a BBL that will articulate our aspiration to have control over our economic and natural resources will still be the clamor of the Muslim people.
Question: It has been pointed out in previous hearings on the proposed BBL in the Senate that there is a need to be more explicit and more specific in the provisions regarding the delineation of functions in the BBL. Do you agree with this?
Prof. Tayao: Yes and no. In the original draft of the proposed BBL, the list of the exclusive powers of the regional government is already extensive. Compared with that of the autonomous region in Spain, it is very long and there are several functions and powers which are already repetitive. However, the list of shared powers is not as clear. How will the “concurrent” functions be shared? As I have said, there has to be a distinction between the Legislative and the Executive. Delineating the functions is actually quite difficult because when it comes to governance, there is a natural overlap to give room for cooperation and collaboration. That is why an intergovernmental relations body is crucial especially for a country like the Philippines which under the existing political framework, has no mechanism for purposes of harmonizing and making sure that things will work. While there is a proposal for an intergovernmental relations body in the draft BBL, it should be made more concrete and institutionalized. For instance, it is not clear whether the intergovernmental relations body will have an office. What will be its composition? How will it function? Will its decisions be taken as recommendations or will they be automatically adopted by both the national and regional governments?
Question: What is your reaction on the proposal that the funding of the Bangsamoro government be pegged on the functions and responsibilities that they will have?
Prof. Tayao: I am not sure whether they did a benchmark. Sometimes, there is a tendency for us to easily regard an amount as huge, without comparing it, for instance, with the budget of other regions. We also have to remember that the main difference with the block grant in the proposed BBL is that by way of policy, it is automatically appropriated, no strings attached. Therefore, it does not matter whether you are close to Malacañang or not. Since it is institutionalized, you will receive it, just like the IRA of the LGUs. There has to be a condition, of course, that the same accountability standards will be followed. By institutionalizing it, you will, in effect, be minimizing patronage politics which is actually the reason why we had the Maguindanao massacre.
Dean Bacani: I just want to point out some issues that were raised with regard to the block grant. First, it seems to be an issue of trust. There is a concern that it will be misused or end up in the pockets of the Bangsamoro officials. For this, perhaps you may want to explore on adding some standards, in the same manner that the Constitution requires that education be given the highest priority in terms of the budget. Second, the block grant formula seems to be arbitrarily formulated. We do not even know how big or small the Bangsamoro government bureaucracy will be and how much it will cost. The Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) which is supposed to come up with a plan is yet to be organized. Third, there seems to be a misinformation on how much the establishment of the Bangsamoro government will really cost. If you look at it closely, only around two billion pesos will be added to the current budget of the ARMM for the Bangsamoro autonomous region but what is being reported in the media is a very big amount. Fourth, it is not a question of money but the absorptive capacity of the bureaucracy. Even the national government has a problem with this, as manifested in the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). It is not just a question of having more powers and more resources than the ARMM. It is a question of whether we are creating a bureaucracy that will be more efficient than the autonomous region we have now. There are no “ifs” and “buts”, the proposed BBL has to be better than the ARMM.
Question: Don’t we need to provide a transitory provision in the draft BBL for the winding down of the affairs of the ARMM? Will the accountabilities and liabilities of the ARMM be absorbed by the new Bangsamoro government?
Atty. Mitmug: There is actually a Coordination Team for the Transition (CT4T) which was organized to be the primary mechanism to ensure that the necessary steps are undertaken in preparation for the transition to the Bangsamoro government. I am part of it as the representative of the ARMM together with other representatives from the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) and the MILF. What we are trying to do now is to gather information and make an inventory of our assets and receivables, the number of employees we have, how many of them have loans, etc. Hopefully, by the end of the year, we will have a comprehensive picture. As for the suggestion of including a winding down provision in the proposed BBL, I think it is a good idea because it will institutionalize the CT4T. Right now, it is acting as an ad hoc committee and only convenes whenever the members have free time. With that provision, it would make it easier for the ARMM to transition to the Bangsamoro government.
Question: What other countries have a comparable experience with the Philippines in terms of granting autonomy to a region?
Dr. Kumar: There is a number of countries that have had similar experiences to those of the Philippines. One is Indonesia and as I have discussed, India. They are not federal countries and are described by their constitutions as central states but they have granted to certain regions very large amounts of autonomy. In Indonesia, both West Papua and Aceh have very significant levels of autonomy. In the case of Aceh, there was a movement called Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) which is quite similar with the MILF. Similarly, one-third of India’s states came out of insurgencies. The levels of autonomy that are granted to the states over a period of time has grown progressively. They can even negotiate their own deals with foreign governments, they can go to the World Bank for loans, etc. And then there is also the case of Scotland in the United Kingdom and Quebec in Canada. It is also possible to have sub-autonomous regions.
Everything that is being raised as an issue in the Philippines is actually encountered already, sometimes even more strongly in other situations in other countries in the world. The Philippines is not unique in facing this sort of issues but the answers, of course, will have to be unique to the Philippine situation.
Question: What is the basis of the proposal to have 60 members in the Bangsamoro parliament? In the event that only two provinces opt to be included in the Bangsamoro region, 60 members might be too many to represent the two provinces. As a comparison, there are only 24 senators for the entire Republic of the Philippines.
Dean Bacani: The proposal is that 40 percent of the parliament will come from member districts. So if a particular area is not part of the Bangsamoro territory then they will not be entitled to any district representation. The main problem in this proportional representation system is that the basis is not clear, whether it is the population or the number of registered voters.
Question: What if the Tausugs and the Maranaos clamor for their own autonomous region?
Dean Bacani: This is possible through an act of Congress so that an amendment can be introduced to the draft BBL. It is possible to have two sub-autonomous regions because as discussed in the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi are separate and distinct from each other. A possible set-up could be one autonomous region for cultural autonomy, personal autonomy, Shari'ah and education, and then another one in terms of governance as a type of administrative organization.
This report was written by the Senate Economic Planning Office (SEPO) for IAG.