Bangsamoro Remains An Opportunity
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I wrote on 02 February last year that Mindanao, particularly establishing a real functioning autonomous regional government is an opportunity. Just to be more specific this time, apart from the obvious economic opportunity noting the region’s development potential and its strategic location, the current initiative to establish a Bangsamoro Regional government, is an opportunity to finally get the much needed and long delayed political reforms to take off. Since 1965 there had been advocacies to change the current Presidential-Unitary system to one that is Parliamentary-Federal system. These advocacies remain, albeit muted in the current administration. This despite many of those in government today have always advocated for the same reforms.
There are 2 main reasons why the current peace process, the establishment of a new Bangsamoro government is an opportunity. One, a successful autonomous regional government can serve as a model, a good basis to push for a federal system in the country. At the very least, if the Bangsamoro will be a real functioning autonomous region, the Cordillera, the other region decreed in the 1987 Constitution, to be granted autonomy by the state, will now have a better reason to really pursue autonomy. Essentially, a successful functioning regional government will show that local governance is more potent with amalgamation, with a bigger constituency and or political jurisdiction. It will therefore be an argument as well against the further division of local governments in the country, a key issue that does not only weaken the development capacity of local government units (LGUs), but also promote the rule of political dynasties in the country. Of course, this requires another discussion to be better understood.
The second main reason that makes the establishment of this Bangsamoro government is the focus of this short piece. Because the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has seriously approached political reforms by way of systems change, its establishment will serve as a way for us to see a parliamentary system at work in the country; an opportunity for many of us to see first hand the different dynamics in a parliamentary system compared to the prevailing presidential system in the country. This time, whatever reference advocates have for or against the adoption of the parliamentary system in the country, it need not be entirely on the experience of other countries that some would say may not be applicable to the country.
One might argue that politics in the Bangsamoro region remain essentially about clans and families that a party-based politics and governance is simply impossible to even imagine. On the other hand, it is precisely this particular condition (which many in fact have the tendency to assume to be worst than the dynastic politics prevailing in other areas in the country) that will make the best argument in favor of the parliamentary system being a better political system if it works as intended and or anticipated in the Bangsamoro. Of course the skeptic will say, precisely “if it will work”, and I dare say based simply on the different systemic characteristics or dynamics in a parliamentary system, it will work, at the least, it will result to a more policy oriented politics and governance than as it is now as the long imagined party-based politics in the country will work better in the parliamentary regional government.
All these are based on the assumption that a parliamentary system will work only if there are real political parties. The question however is if the current presidential system, especially with the long-standing elitist political and economic structure in the country, can evolve a working party system, say with the right legislation and not by shifting to a parliamentary system. The question then is which between evolving a real party system and shifting to a parliamentary system comes first.
The above discussion are important considerations in looking at the significance of the system proposed to be adopted under a new Bangsamoro Government. Chief Government Negotiator, Miriam Coronel Ferrer believes that with the new version of a Bangsamoro law drafted by Sen. Bongbong Marcos, the objective of having party-based politics in the region is no longer tenable as it will promote “personalistic” politics. The reason is that the composition of what is to be the Bangsamoro parliament has been essentially changed. Section 5, Art. VII in the original draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) provides that there will be a total of 60 members of the Parliament, 40% elected by single-member districts, 50% by party list, and 10% sectoral representation. This translates to 24 single-member district members, 30 party-list members and 6 sectoral representatives. Under the proposal of Sen. Bongbong Marcos, Section 36, Article VII, there will be total of 60 members of parliament, 40 of which elected by single-member districts, 10 by party-list and 10 for sectoral representation.
This means, from the original intended mixed system of representation, the proposal of Sen. Marcos is essentially the same composition where majority is elected by single member “plurality” districts, as it is in the House of Representatives. Just so that we can understand it better, plurality means it doesn’t matter how many runs in a district. The winner will only be determined by whoever gets the most number of votes. For example, in a 5-way race, the winner needs only at least 21% of the total votes cast to win. This means, the vote is on the person and not on the party, even if the person is running under the banner of a particular party. With the draft of Sen. Marcos, instead of 40%, there will now be a majority of 67% elected by single member districts, which, considering that elites or dynastic political families have always ruled in the south and in most places in the country, it is expected that the same families will dominate in the elections and therefore perpetrate their hold in power. The result, it is averred that the projected development of a party-based system of politics in the Bangsamoro will therefore not happen. The 20 remaining members in the parliament elected by parties and sectors will most likely not be politically significant considering of course that they are considerably outnumbered.
For the benefit of review we should note that the fundamental difference that make the parliamentary system better than the presidential system is that it is a collegial government. It will function only with a majority in parliament agreeing to act together. There can only be an Executive or a Prime Minister if there is a working majority in the Parliament. Let’s say, majority will be from elite families, their individual interests will matter only if they will be able to work together. There will be no Bangsamoro Government in place if there is no majority in the Parliament and individually, they are not capable of doing anything, good or bad. This means that even if there are differences among families, they will have to learn how to work together.
The danger therefore is not so much about personalistic politics where policies will now again be sacrificed in favor of individual ambitions and abuse of power, not to mention of course of the significant waste of government funds and resources. The danger in this case is more of the failure to form government and the persistent peril of calling for general elections with a vote of no confidence. The difficulty of forming governments is significant if we assume that members of parliament who are from elite families will not and or cannot cooperate. The same reason may be cited of the persistent dangers of dissolving parliament via no confidence vote. Section 64, Article VII in the Marcos draft provides that a two-thirds no confidence vote can declare the position of Chief Minister vacant. This is the same in Section 34, Article VII of the original draft of the BBL but essentially more problematic as it immediately calls for a dissolution of parliament.
The argument of the framers of the original BBL is that this provision will make the members of the Parliament think twice in voting out a sitting Chief Minister. Of course, it might work, but the cost is colossal if it turns out to be not enough to deter members of parliament to go after the Chief Minister. Consider especially that it is easier for self-interested people to band together against a sitting Chief Minister as each will have the opportunity to take the position than to agree and support a common candidate for the position. It’s just compelling to ask why the more potent option of having a “constructive vote of no confidence” was not considered. This is the best way if the objective is to prevent a government from losing an executive at any time. The constructive vote unseats a sitting Chief Minister only by electing a new one. There is no time therefore that the position is vacant. The members of Parliament cannot band together just to have the position vacant. They have to come together to elect a new executive.
The long and short of it is that the new draft Basic Law retains a parliamentary system while the composition was considerably changed. I have to agree that the original draft is ideal in evolving a real party-based political and governmental system in the region. The rules in the parliamentary system is the same though, hence the requirement of having the majority to work together remains. The elites will definitely remain dominant as they will still be the majority in the parliament, but they will have to play by different rules than as it is in a presidential system where a single executive calls the shots. Call it party based or what, but it is essentially a “collegial” system.