The Tripartite Review
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Second part of a series
The Tripartite Review of the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) has been the subject of much debates and interpretation following the Zamboanga 19-day debacle. The MNLF side believes that the now infamous letter of Presidential Adviser, Sec. Teresita Deles, to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) asking for the ‘closure’ of the Tripartite Review precipitated the MNLF declaration of Independence and the subsequent Zamboanga standoff that turned into tragedy. On the other hand, the government side believes that it has remained committed to the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement albeit the request to bring closure to the Tripartite Review.
What is this Tripartite Review that is now in the eye of the stormy relations between the Philippine government and the MNLF?
To begin with, it is an understatement to say that the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Philippine Government and the MNLF is a smooth one. I have been both a witness and a participant not only in the peace process between the GPH and the MNLF since 1993 to 1996 but also in the implementation of said agreement serving as the united and common Floor Leader of the 81-member Consultative Assembly for the Southern Philippines (composed of the 41 MNLF Representatives, All Provincial Governors and City Mayors and 10 CSO/NGOs).
From day one, the ‘wrangling’ over the right reading and correct interpretation of the FPA between the GPH and the MNLF was at the heart of the debates. But the ‘savoir faire’ of former President Fidel V. Ramos and his ‘bright boys’ led by ES Ruben Torres, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Ambassador Manuel Yan, and NSC Jose Almonte made all the difference. They were “PRO” and they were able to navigate the thorny waters of differing reading and interpretation with much ease and they, too, ‘handled’ Chairman Nur Misuari and the MNLF with great professionalism.
I was a witness and a participant being the Floor Leader of the Consultative Assembly to some of the annual meetings of the OIC that reserved half a day or a day ‘reviewing’ the implementation of the FPA. In all these meetings, there were always two opposing sides. The first was the Philippine Government side that painted the ‘implementation of the FPA as on track’. The other side was the MNLF version that reported the contrary.
The third side was that of the OIC at whose auspices, the FPA agreement was forged. The OIC, year in and year out, would hear both sides and prod the two parties to abide by the FPA with patience, sincerity and generosity after all the real crux of any peace agreement is NOT in the signing of a peace document but in the implementation of the negotiated settlement.
Things began to change with the change of administration from FVR to ERAP in 1998. While ERAP had a clear position vis-à-vis the MILF as ‘terrorists’, he had an ambiguous position vis-à-vis MNLF and the FPA. President Estrada seemed to simply tolerate the two transitional bodies - the five- member SPCPD and the 81-member Consultative Council tasked as the implementing mechanisms of the FPA. The SPCPD served as the “Executive” and the Consultative Assembly functioned as the ‘policy making’ body for the whole Special Zone of Peace and Development or SZOPAD composed of all the provinces and all cities therein as provided for by the 1976 Tripoli Peace Agreement.
Under nine years of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the debates began to circle around the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao - the institutional arrangement earlier created under President Corazon Aquino by RA 6734 in 1989 implementing the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1986 Philippine Constitution. It was NOT functioning well, and they began to think it was Chairman Nur’s fault. (In 2011, the PNoy Adminstration ‘judged’ the ARMM as a FAILED EXPERIMENT and this was ten years after Nur Misuari as Governor.)
The FPA required an amendamentory law to revise and/or improve the existing RA 6734. The new law would contain the provisions of the FPA and once the new law was enacted, there would be a new referendum, re-organization of the ARMM and then the first ‘election’ under the New Organic Act.
It sounded easy in theory, but it was a rough sailing from day one of the ‘concoction’ of the new law. The Philippine Government through Congress UNILATERALLY interpreted the FPA and subsequently enacted the law, RA 9054, without the help or assistance of the other partner in the FPA, the MNLF. The MNLF did NOT accept the process of the enactment of RA 9054 and they also rejected the product - the law itself as the final implementation of the 1996 FPA.
Since the new law is deemed a violation of the FPA, the MNLF believe that the Transitional Phase is NOT concluded. On the other hand, the Government believes that with the new law, the referendum and the re-organization of the ARMM, the FPA is fully implemented. These two opposing sides required the new intervention of the OIC thus the TRIPARTITE REVIEW on the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement that began in 2007.
Through the Tripartite Review, both GPH and the MNLF agreed and recognized that there were about 44 gaps between the Law, RA 9054 and the FPA. Both also agreed that RA 9054 should be amended to bring it closer to the FPA. They have agreed in almost all the points except for the understanding of the transitional phase, territory, and the definition and wealth sharing on the strategic minerals as contained in the provisions of the FPA.
These three remaining issues needed to be brought to closure and this could only be done through the Tripartite Review. The Philippine Government’s request to bring closure to the Tripartite Review has turned into a real nightmare. The aborted September Tripartite review was to discuss the request of the Philippine Government.
The OIC, however, has made its position clear, that is, “the OIC WARNS against the untimely termination of this process (Tripartite Review) as it will create a vacuum that is NOT conducive to building peace or enhancing security”.
Now we are all witness to the nightmare created by the gap between the GPH and the MNLF. On this count both the GPH and the MNLF should share the blame. This is a very costly adventurism both by the GPH and the MNLF. It is sort of an explosive mix between ‘MESSIANISM’ on the part of government’s peace adviser and Chairman Nur Misuari who is a REBEL at heart. This mixture should CARRY a big sign to tell all and sundry: DANGER! CUIDATE!
NEXT: Part 3 - The MNLF Politics
Fr. Eliseo Mercado is senior policy adviser at the Institute for Autonomy & Governance. Follow him on Twitter @junmeromi.