I write this column from my hometown, Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao where it has been raining the whole week. One cannot but wonder when this deluge would end and whether this changing climate would be an insurmountable obstacle to realizing the promise of this great island. Ironically, while musing about climate change and my island, I am also reviewing for a policymaker the progress of the peace process involving the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Philippines (GPH). I say ironic because, as late as three years ago, I would have said this conflict in Mindanao was the remaining obstacle to Mindanao development and prosperity.

With the signing of the Annex on Power Sharing between the MILF and the GPH late last year, I am now more optimistic that closure is at hand with respect at least to this particular peace process. This Annex, the third of fourth and definitely the most challenging in terms of scope and complexity of issues, took 16 months of hard-nosed negotiations since the Technical Working Groups first convened in August 2012. Presidential Adviser on Peace Process Ging Deles herself admitted after the signing that “the agreement came after a very difficult round.”

The signing came in the wake of the Zamboanga incident where forces of the Moro National Liberation Front led by its founding chairman, Nur Misuari, laid siege to the city to protest their supposed marginalization by the government in the peace talks. The Annex is a crucial agreement that delineates the power sharing arrangement between the central government and the proposed Bangsamoro political entity which shall serve as guide in the drafting of the basic law in accordance with the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement.

The Annex on Power Sharing is divided into four parts: intergovernmental relations, governance structure of the Bangsamoro Ministerial Government, and Other Matters pertaining to power-sharing such as transportation and communication, mineral and energy sources, taxation, powers already devolved to the ARMM which are relevant to the FAB.  It is the third of four annexes needed to complete the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The first, Annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities, was signed in February while the Annex on Revenue-Generation and Wealth-Sharing, was signed in July. The parties committed to complete the Annex on Normalization by yearend 2012 which then completes the four components of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The following points define the power sharing arrangement between the GPH and the MILF:

The relationship between the central government and the Bangsamoro government is asymmetric; which means that the governmental relations between the Bangsamoro government and the central government is unlike that presently existing between the central government and the regions and other local government units. The Bangsamoro Agreement is reflective of the aspirations of the Bangsamoro self-governance.

As provided, the Bangsamoro shall have a ministerial form of government. As explained by then-peace panel chair and now Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, it is akin to a parliamentary government where genuine political parties will “dominate and try to capture seats that are allocated maybe to various geographical areas or probably the presenting certain sectors” and from which they select their chief minister, but stressed that they would still be under the supervision of the President.

There shall be a Bangsamoro cabinet composed of a democratically elected Chief Minister, a Deputy Minister and such other ministers as may be necessary to perform their job. There shall be a Bangsamoro Assembly with the power to remove the government of the day by a vote of no confidence of at least two-thirds of the assembly.

The Framework Agreement delineates three levels of power namely: reserved, concurrent and exclusive powers. Reserved powers are powers or matters over which authority and jurisdiction are retained by the central government; concurrent powers are those shared between the central government and Bangsamoro government and exclusive powers are those over which authority and jurisdiction pertain to the Bangsamoro government.

Powers reserved to the central government include: defense and external security, foreign policy; coinage and monetary policy; postal service; citizenship and naturalization; immigration; customs and tariff; common market and global trade; and intellectual property rights.

Powers exercised concurrently by both parties within the Bangsamoro include: social security and pensions; quarantine; land registration; pollution control; human rights and humanitarian protection and promotion; penology and penitentiary; auditing; civil service; coast guard; enforcement of customs and tariff laws and regulations; administration of justice; funding for maintenance of national roads, irrigation and irrigation system; disaster risk reduction management; and public order and safety.

There are around fifty-eight (58) specific powers exclusively granted to the Bangsamoro government, the more noteworthy of which are: agriculture, livestock and food security; economic and cultural exchange; contract loans and credits; trade and industry; labor and employment; creation of sources of revenue; free ports; and others. 

After months of painstaking negotiations the parties have come tantalizingly close to the completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Yet while the agreement inspires hope that the dream of a peaceful solution to the Mindanao conflict will finally materialize, at least insofar as the conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine government is concerned, there is also reason to assume an attitude of guarded optimism.  For one the Bangsamoro Basic Law has yet to be drafted and ratified; the Bangsamoro government established and fully made operational; other formal processes have yet to be undertaken. Concededly, all these will mean more time and along the way more obstacles have to be surmounted. The more immediate concern is how to encourage the MNLF to stop any and all attempts to disrupt the whole process and instead to actively participate therein in order to be able to partake of the good outcome that it will surely bring. Be that as it may, the signing of the Annex on Power Sharing is one obstacle less on the long road to peace in Mindanao.

Now we wait for the final annex – on normalization. After that, the ball will be in the court of Congress.

"Eagle Eyes" is Dean Tony La Viña's column in Manila Standard Today. Follow him on Facebook: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. 

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