The 5th SONA and peace in Mindanao
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The peoples of Mindanao are awaiting what PNoy will include or exclude in his 5th State of the Nation Address or SONA come the 28th of July 2014.
In the previous SONA, Mindanao appeared simply as "footnote" in an overall national agenda.
READ: State of the Nation Address 2013 Filipino | English
While there are major strides achieved in the peace process in Southern Philippines during the last three years, there are basic questions whether PNoy’s peace advisers and negotiators have been forthright with the MILF, the MNLF, and the various stakeholders in the Southern Philippines.
While there are major strides achieved in the peace process in Southern Philippines during the last three years, there are basic questions whether PNoy’s peace advisers and negotiators have been forthright with the MILF, the MNLF, and the various stakeholders in the Southern Philippines.
There are six major agreements during PNoy’s watch. These are the following:
- the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed in October 2012;
- the Agreement on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities signed in February 2013;
- the Agreement on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing signed in July 2013;
- the Agreement on Power Sharing signed in December 2013;
- the Agreement on Normalization and the Bangsamoro Waters and Zones of Joint Concerns in January 2014; and
- the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed on March 27, 2014.
These major strides in the peace process between the GPH and the MILF were achieved without reference to the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Yet even a cursory look at these major agreements would point that these agreements were beyond the "flexibilities" of the Constitution.
This would lead to the crucial question whether the PNoy government is open to constitutional amendments to "accommodate" the legitimate aspirations of the Bangsamoro for (1) their unique identity, (2) their ancestral domain and (3) the exclusive powers not only to govern themselves but also to have control and supervision over the resources within their domain. Without Constitutional amendment on the table, the PNoy government remains, simply, on Cloud 9. By any imagination (creative, flexible or otherwise), sans constitutional amendments, government would be SHORT in the delivery of its commitments.
This would lead to the crucial question whether the PNoy government is open to constitutional amendments to "accommodate" the legitimate aspirations of the Bangsamoro for (1) their unique identity, (2) their ancestral domain and (3) the exclusive powers not only to govern themselves but also to have control and supervision over the resources within their domain. Without Constitutional amendment on the table, the PNoy government remains, simply, on Cloud 9. By any imagination (creative, flexible or otherwise), sans constitutional amendments, government would be SHORT in the delivery of its commitments.
PNoy and his peace advisers need to descend from Cloud 9 and admit with clarity and all honesty that the previously articulated "flexibilities" of the Constitution would NOT stretch enough to institutionalize the CAB both in letter and spirit. There are no ifs and buts: The CAB requires amendments to the 1987 Constitution. Without this in the government’s agenda, all what PNoy says and claims are all for the sound bytes!
The real test in the peace process is NOT whether this government can sign a peace agreement with the MILF. Signing an agreement is an easy enough task. The real hurdle for any government is the implementation of the peace agreement both in letter and spirit without resorting to lies and disguises that would only be good for the sound bytes.
The 5th SONA is fast approaching and this would be the time to articulate the clear direction and the real Daang Matuwid in dealing with the Bangsamoro issues. The 5th SONA will be the balance that will weigh PNoy’s legacy in the peace process whether he is BOLD enough to pursue in words and actions amendments to the Constitution that would pave the way for genuine implementation of the CAB.
PNoy, in his 4th SONA (2013), said: “What is clear to me: Every word we utter must result in an action that would benefit all. Every line that we craft in the agreement we are forging must be set in stone and not merely written on water, only to be forgotten by history.” He equally had committed the “strength of the entire nation to lift the provinces of Muslim Mindanao, who are among our poorest.”
These are, indeed, bold statements! The MILF and the great majority of the Bangsamoro now task the President to make true this commitment by endorsing to Congress a draft Basic Law that is faithful to the articulated dreams and aspirations as contained in the CAB. But this would NOT be possible without committing, too, to constitutional change!
The big test for PNoy is WHICH draft BBL would he endorse to Congress. The difficulty lies in the ongoing "conversation" between the Office of the President (OP) and the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) that was tasked to come up with a draft BBL for submission to Congress. The BTC’s draft seems to collide with some provisions of the 1987 Constitution. While the OP draft BBL is constitutionally compliant, it is NOT faithful to the CAB in letter and spirit. If PNoy departs from the four corners of the Constitution, he faces yet another specter of SC’s rebuff.
On the other hand, the MILF appears resolved not to accept the limitations of the Constitution and it refuses to "re-negotiate" the terms in the CAB already settled and signed! Whichever process PNoy adopts in his 4th SONA, Congress has to enact an "acceptable" Bangsamoro Basic Law before the yearend (2014).
Without the acceptable BBL, we are back to the same scenario that produced RA 9054 (the Organic Act of ARMM) that "legislated" the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GPH and the MNLF. The MNLF rejected RA 9054 as the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. There, never, has been any closure of the 1996 Peace Agreement and this is precisely the subject of the on-going Tripartite (GPH-OIC-MNLF) Review.
A diluted BBL, notwithstanding all the rhetoric, would simply repeat previous legal arrangement akin to the creation of the ARMM but with NO real substance being added to the package except for the new brand—Bangsamoro.
Fr. Eliseo Mercado, OMI is senior policy adviser at the Institute for Autonomy & Governance. Follow him on Twitter @junmeromi. Visit his blog at GMA News Online.