As the region counts down to its first-ever parliamentary election, IEMC monitors say a wave of coordinated digital manipulation — armed-group threats, doctored photos, and AI-generated fakes — is testing the electoral process online.

COTABATO CITY — In the final stretch before the September 14 vote, the fight over BARMM's first parliamentary election isn't only happening in campaign stops — it's happening in the comment sections, group chats, and vlogs, where monitors from the Independent Election Monitoring Center (IEMC) say a surge of coordinated disinformation is testing the region's information space just as hard as its electoral machinery.

“The closer we get to the ballot box, the louder the digital noise becomes,” said Sheila Algabre, head of operations at the IEMC, which is headquartered in Cotabato City. One of her teams is tracking the region’s social media landscape. The center’s social media desk has so far compiled four distinct threat patterns that have emerged in the campaign’s final week — each exploiting a different vulnerability in how voters get their information, and each carrying real-world stakes for a region where the line between political rivalry and the fragile gains of the peace process is thin.

Armed-Group Signaling: Weaponizing the Fear of War

The most volatile thread running through this week's disinformation wave isn't fabricated footage — it's fear, dressed up as inside information. Monitors have flagged a coordinated pattern of posts and vlogs invoking the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), to intimidate local leaders ahead of the vote. One high-engagement vlog, generating over 1,200 likes, was straight-up fearmongering, commentating on a supposed claim that an MILF commander was preparing for large-scale conflict against political rivals in the event of electoral fraud.

The narrative doesn't stop there. In Lanao del Sur, separate text-only posts circulated alleging that MILF forces had physically blockaded and disarmed Armed Forces of the Philippines soldiers passing through their territory. The claim was checked by NDBC, an IEMC-affiliated media partner, directly with local military contacts, who indicated that no such incident occurred.

The initial assessment is already flagging these narratives as a deliberate strategy: framing the election in existential terms, as though the survival of the peace process itself hinges on a single party’s victory.

Cheapfakes: Real Photos, False Claims

A second, quieter tactic doesn't require any technical sophistication at all — just a search engine and a willingness to lie about context. One viral post, which drew over 2,000 likes and 852 shares, claimed that Turkish police were being deployed to guard the September 14 polls against fraud. The photo itself is real: publicly available images from a Turkish police parade, taken thousands of kilometers away and with no connection to BARMM whatsoever. Stripped of that context and recaptioned, the image was repurposed to suggest that local authorities can't be trusted to run a clean election — and that outside forces are stepping in where domestic institutions have failed.

It's a technique known as a "cheapfake": no editing software required, just a real image put in a false frame.

Generative AI Enters the Campaign

If cheapfakes represent disinformation's low-tech end, this week marked a clear escalation at the other extreme. IEMC monitors say generative AI has now been used to manufacture entire fabricated events from nothing.

In one case, a widely shared post claimed that Haon Sindatok, identified as an MILF interim base commander, had been arrested in a joint AFP-PNP operation. Forensic review found the accompanying photo was entirely AI-generated — visual analysts pointed to warped background elements, inconsistent lighting, and irregularities in hand rendering as telltale signs of synthetic origin. No such arrest took place.

In a second case, another post published an AI-generated image purporting to show a group of teachers in Maguindanao del Norte holding cash and identification, alleging each had been paid ₱20,000 to rig the vote. The photo, like the arrest image, was fabricated.

Where cheapfakes borrow reality and distort it, these images invent reality outright — built and presented as documentation for a scandal being propagated to generate outrage against a rival party.

Claims of Voter Coercion in Cotabato City

The fourth pattern is more localized, but no less concerning to monitors watching for signs that online narratives could translate into offline pressure.

In Cotabato City, localized posts allege that BIAF commanders are directly pressuring barangay chairmen to fall in line — with some posts going further, claiming armed personnel could replace accredited poll watchers on election day itself. Unlike the fabricated arrest and vote-buying images, these posts rely on illustrative AI-generated graphics rather than any claim of documentary evidence. But monitors say that hasn't slowed their spread through hyperlocal networks, and the claims remain under active, open monitoring.

Volatile Information Space

"The technical machinery of BARMM’s automated election is locked and loaded, but the information space is highly volatile," the assessment states. With several cases already recorded for further verification, IEMC’s social media monitors say the greater concern is how quickly manufactured panic can spread — particularly in areas where tensions are already high — and how online narratives can influence perceptions and behavior beyond the screen.