Amina Rasul is co-convenor and  president of Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID). This is a repost of a December 17, 2012 article from the PCID website. 

 

Any analysis of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao cannot be meaningfully accomplished without a discussion of the historical antecedents that have determined the path in which peace and development have been pursued in the southern Philippines. This discussion of autonomy cannot be divorced from the different stages in the peace efforts with the Muslim separatists, as well as the steps taken after the so-called “Final Peace Agreement” was signed in 1996 between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). After all, it was to conciliate the interests of the Muslims as represented by the MNLF that the idea of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao was first advanced.

 

Historical Overview of Autonomy in Muslim Mindanao

 

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was borne out of the need to solve the decades-long conflict in the southern Philippines. Feeling neglected and oppressed, the Moro National Liberation Front finally transformed frustration and anger into bullets when it rose up in arms against the government in the 1974. The MNLF battle cry was the right to self-determination and an independent “Bangsa Moro” (Moro Nation).

 

Hoping to quell the insurrection, the Marcos regime signed the Tripoli Agreement in December of 1976 with the MNLF. This provided for a cessation in hostilities and the establishment of autonomy in Mindanao which covered 13 provinces. With this agreement, the original aim of independence was reduced to a quest for autonomy – possession of the right to self-determination but within the framework and territorial integrity of the Philippines.

 

However, the Marcos government violated the terms of the accord by holding a plebiscite for the provinces and asking them if they would want to be part of the autonomous Mindanao identified in the Tripoli Agreement. This made autonomy conditional instead of automatic. The MNLF thus pulled out of the talks.

 

The same story unfolded when the government of Aquino once more entered into negotiations with the MNLF. The then-newly promulgated 1987 Constitution, in Section 15 of Article X provided for autonomy in Muslim Mindanao upon the passage of a law. Despite objections of the MNLF to making autonomy conditional on legislative action rather than on the provisions of the existing Tripoli Agreement, government forged ahead with its plans, and Republic Act 6734 otherwise known as the Organic Act of ARMM was passed on August 1, 1989.

 

Following this law, a plebiscite in the 13 provinces identified in the Tripoli Agreement was held on November 19, 1989 to determine which areas would comprise what would be known as the “Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” or ARMM. Only four of the thirteen provinces – Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi – opted to be part of the ARMM. The MNLF as the representative of the Bangsa Moro was not party to the creation of the Organic Act, nor to the plebiscite. Autonomy was still elusive and the actions that were taken were unilateral on the part of government, an element that undermined the quest for self-determination of Muslim Mindanao.

 

Thus, while not a full-scale war, the conflict in Mindanao continued after “autonomy” was formally granted in Muslim Mindanao. It was autonomy without the consent and participation of the MNLF, and it was an autonomy that can be characterized as an imposition of the vision of one party – the Philippine government — over the other – the Moros (Filipino Muslims) represented by the MNLF. It was not the autonomy negotiated by both parties in the Tripoli Agreement, and therefore, peace was never won.

 

When Ramos became president in 1992, he made peace and security a priority and a requisite for development efforts. He specifically made mention of continuing the stalled negotiations with the rebels in Muslim Mindanao. In this vein, he set up institutions that would shepherd the peace process: the National Unification Commission, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Negotiating Panels, the National Amnesty Commission, and the National Program for Unification and Development.

 

The government once more restarted the peace process with the MNLF, with the negotiations anchored on the principle that what they were discussing was to resolve the non-implementation of the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement. This is supported by the fact that the exploratory talks hosted by Indonesia in 1993 stated that “the talks will focus on the modalities for the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in letter and spirit”.

 

Therefore, when the agreement between the government and the MNLF was finally signed in September of 1996, it was formally called “The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the Participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial Committee of the Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference”. The shorthand for the accord is the Final Peace Agreement, of FPA.

 

But even before the agreement was signed, the government and the MNLF have maintained different perspectives on a key issue. The MNLF has always viewed the Tripoli Agreement and its full implementation as the ultimate reason for talking, and entering into peace. However, the Tripoli Agreement does state that “the Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire agreement”.

 

This statement is the source of the disagreement in the first plebiscite held by Marcos, as well as the subsequent one under Aquino. This is also the reason why the MNLF objected to the provision of the 1987 Constitution that mandated Philippine Congress to define autonomy through legislation. Any law passed by Congress could have superseded the terms of the Tripoli Agreement, and government could justify this violation by pointing to the so-called escape clause built-in by Marcos.

 

The MNLF claims that the Organic Act and the plebiscite which defined the scope of the ARMM was violative of the Tripoli Agreement, while government claims that it is within the boundaries of the agreement, since the Organic Act and the plebiscite were all actions within the framework of the Philippine Constitution.

 

In the end, the FPA was still entered into, and we are now into the 15th year of its implementation.

 

Autonomy in Transition

 

The implementation of the peace agreement of 1996 envisioned a two-stage implementation in the pursuit of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao: phase one which would be the preparatory phase, and phase two for a full-blown implementation.

 

The three years (1996 – 1999) of phase one was implemented to give the ARMM the necessary time to develop its institutional and procedural strengths in order to take on the challenges of autonomy, and be ready for phase two. It is critical to analyze phase one because it was the laying of the foundations for the future of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao.

 

Executive Order No. 371 passed by Ramos in October 2, 1996 (a month after the signing of the FPA) was the first major step in accomplishing the terms of the agreement.

 

It created the Special Zone for Peace and Development, or SZOPAD. Following the geographic coverage of the Tripoli Agreement, it was created under phase one to be the focus of development efforts. But the original 13 provinces now became 14 due to the creation of the province of Saranggani within the boundaries of the original agreement. The following provinces were part of the SZOPAD:

 

1. Basilan
2. Davao del Sur
3. Lanao del Norte
4. Lanao del Sur
5. Maguindanao
6. North Cotabato
7. Palawan
8. South Cotabato
9. Saranggani
10. Sulu
11. Sultan Kudarat
12. Tawi-Tawi
13. Zamboanga del Sur
14. Zamboanga del Norte

 

Nine cities were also under the jurisdiction of the SZOPAD namely: Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga, and Puerto Princesa. According to the former ARMM governor and former MNLF Foreign Minister Parouk Hussin, SZOPAD comprised 23% of the Philippines’ land area, around 15% of the total Philippine population, and generated 50% of mineral production in the south, as well as 25% of total aquatic and marine production for the country. (Hussin: 2003)

 

EO 371 also created the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) along with its Consultative Assembly. The SPCPD was to be the primary implementing mechanism for the development efforts in the SZOPAD, and the 81-member Consultative Assembly was going to act as the advisory body to the SPCPD.

 

The Consultative assembly was supposed to be comprised by the chair of the SPCPD as head, the governor and vice governor of the ARMM, the 14 provincial governors and 9 city mayors of the SZOPAD, 44 members of the MNLF, and 11 sectoral representatives nominated by civil society. (May: 2002)

 

But at the outset, this arrangement was criticized. The question of whether these transitional bodies (SZOPAD, SPCPC, and the Consultative Assembly) could have truly begun the process towards self-determination was raised. Due to objections from national and local politicians (most of whom were not involved in the peace process), the provisions of the executive order were diluted thus:

 

“Among other things, the provision in the agreement for forty-four MNLF members in the Consultative Assembly was dropped, and the provisions of the agreement which placed specified government agencies under the control and/or supervision of the SPCPD were deleted. In fact, the SPCPD was given little scope for policy action except through the Office of the President.” (May: 2002)

 

Hence, contrary to what was agreed upon, the three institutions (SZOPAD, SPCPD, and the Consultative Assembly) did not possess significant autonomy. They derived their powers from the Office of the President. The same is true for the Regional Executive Council of ARMM and the ARMM Regional Governor, who according to the Organic Act “dispenses with his power and authority on behalf of the President, who exercises overall supervision on regional and local government affairs”. Accordingly, these regional institutions became mere “appendages of the Executive Office” (Bauzon: 1999).

 

It is interesting to note that the ARMM is treated like any other local government unit, as manifested in the provisions of the Organic Act. If the powers of the Autonomous Region is derived from and supervised by the central government, then can it be correctly called autonomous?

 

The creation of the SPCPD was aimed at coordinating development efforts in SZOPAD, in order to lay the foundations of autonomy in Mindanao. But the opposite seems to have happened. According to the former Majority Leader of the Consultative Assembly, Eliseo Mercado, the failure of the transition to autonomy could be attributed to the fact that the SPCPD as the primary mechanism for development did not have clear and delineated roles and relationships with the existing governance structures in the region. (Bacani: 2004)

 

There was no clear understanding as to how the SPCPD and the CA could spur development in SZOPAD because it did not possess any internal powers and what it did possess was not clearly identified. There was no meaningful linkage between the SPCPD and other regional mechanisms such as the regional development councils and regional peace and order councils. Its relationships to the existing local government units were also not spelled out (Mercado: 2006; Bacani: 2004)

 

Instead of fostering development, the SPCPD, SZOPAD, and the Assembly became just another layer in the bureaucracy. Just to underscore the weakness of these transitory structures, it was commented that they

 

“… were too powerless to make an impact. They had very limited funding, no police powers, no control over national projects and programmes that were supposed to be within their remit, and no jurisdiction over significant sections of the bureaucracy in the region” (Gutierrez 1999 as cited in May: 2000).

 

Adding to this, the Philippine President also has a very central role in how the ARMM functions. In fact, the election of the ARMM Regional Governor is said to be heavily influenced by the central government, such that “the governor of ARMM is generally viewed as having his principal loyalty to Manila rather than the local population.” (World Bank: 2005) Beyond these elections, the ARMM Governor still falls under the supervision of the Office of the President, just like any other head of a local government unit.

 

Under President Estrada’s administration, this problem on the transitory structures was magnified when he issued Executive Order 261 in July of 2000. This created the Mindanao Coordinating Council, which was authorized to coordinate all development and infrastructure programs in Mindanao. This Council in effect took over SPCPD’s role in coordinating development efforts in the SZOPAD.

 

In protest over this marginalization of the SPCPD, three prominent officials of the SPCPD and Consultative Assembly resigned, namely: Notre Dame University President Fr. Eliseo Mercado as Majority Floor leader of the SPCPD-Consultative Assembly, Mayor Edward Hagedorn of Puerto Princesa as SPCPD Vice Chairman and Bai Yasmin Macalandong as member of the Consultative Assembly.

 

Notwithstanding the problems in the initial steps (Phase I) in pursuing autonomy in Muslim Mindanao, the government as stipulated in the 1996 Peace Agreement proceeded to Phase II.

 

This stage was supposed to be the realization of full autonomy. A law was to be passed that would amend the old Organic Act of ARMM (RA 6734 passed in 1989) and would redefine the Autonomous Region two years after the beginning of phase I (in 1998). It would also establish an Executive Council, a Legislative Assembly, an administrative system, a system of representation in the national government, a regional security force, an educational system, and an economic and financial system.

 

After a delay of three years, the Philippine Congress passed the amendatory law called Republic Act 9054, or the ARMM’s New Organic Act in 2001. This law is formally known as “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the ARMM, Amending for the Purpose RA No. 6734, Entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao’, As Amended”.

 

Following the law’s provisions, a plebiscite was held on August 14, 2001 This referendum on the expansion of ARMM was objected to by the MNLF. Not unexpectedly, out of the current 15 provinces and nine cities in SZOPAD, only Basilan province and the Islamic City of Marawi joined the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi to form the new ARMM.

 

The nature of this autonomy has been termed “paradoxical”, because as the ARMM was given a special character drawn from new laws, rules and procedures that did not exist in other local governments – purportedly to effect autonomy in the area – these new conditions have become in effect an “unwelcome encumbrance” for ARMM. (Bauzon: 1999) Perhaps more telling is the fact that consistently, the MNLF has objected to the terms of any new law that purports to enhance or deepen autonomy in the area.

These “encumbrances” are manifested in how the transitional bodies have not worked due to the lack of coordination and basic understanding of what they do. This is exacerbated by the electoral process for the ARMM regional governor, which is still heavily influenced by central government.

 

One major issue which has affected how autonomy has functioned within the context of this “new ARMM” is the regional government’s administrative capacity – its technical capabilities, its human resources, and most importantly, its financial resources. But this capacity in turn is mediated by many factors, most important of which is the relationship of the ARMM regional government to national government and its agencies operating within the area. According to the World Bank Joint Needs Assessment for Mindanao (2005) “the multiplicity of institutions involved and their lines of reporting and authority also complicate governance in …Mindanao.” This overlapping of functions and lack of clarity in jurisdictional boundaries has created more problems for the achievement of autonomy.

 

The Administrative Capacity of the ARMM Regional Government

 

ARMM is the only autonomous region in the Philippines, and hence has the only regional government in the Philippines. The other 15 regions in the country are purely administrative areas for deconcentration purposes only, and they have no political powers and no elective positions. ARMM has an executive branch with an elected regional governor and vice-governor, a Regional Legislative Assembly with 21 elected members as its legislature, and a judicial system for personal laws in Islam, or the Shari’ah courts.

 

According to the World Bank Joint Needs Assessment Report (2005), 20 national government agencies have already been devolved to ARMM, on paper. This means that the ARMM Regional Government (ARMM-RG) has the primary responsibility of implementing the functions of these offices, as turned-over by national government. These are:

 

1. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
2. Office of Southern Cultural Communities
3. Department of Agrarian Reform
4. Department of Agriculture
5. Department of Education
6. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
7. Department of Science and Technology
8. Commission on Higher Education
9. Department of Environment and Natural Resources
10. Department of Health
11. Department of Interior and Local Government
12. Department of Tourism
13. Department of Trade and Industry
14. Regional Board of Investments
15. Department of Labor and Employment
16. Department of Public Works and Highways
17. Department of Social Welfare and Development
18. Cooperative Development Authority
19. Regional Tripartite and Wage Productivity Board
20. Regional Ports and Management Authority

 

There are also eight undevolved agencies but with field offices in the ARMM, and nine regionally-created offices (Gomez: 2003)

 

But according to the World Bank assessment, only three agencies have been performing their functions in an autonomous manner. These three are the Interior and Local Government (with the exception of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Bureau of Fire Protection, whose functions continue to be centrally-supervised), Social Welfare and Development, and Trade and Industry.

 

Even within devolved agencies, certain functions and responsibilities remain with the national government. For the new members of the ARMM (Basilan province and Marawi City), the national agencies that were supposed to be devolved continue to get their funding from the regions they used to be part of.

 

What is happening then is autonomy on paper, rather than autonomy in fact, as regards the nature of the bureaucracy of the ARMM-RG. If the key governance mechanism is still dependent on national government, is it reasonable to claim the ARMM is autonomous?

 

Inter-Governmental Relations in ARMM

 

There is an even bigger problem as regards the relationship between the local governments within the ARMM, and the ARMM-RG, as well as their relationships to the national government. The local governments are central to development initiatives, and as ARMM has been given autonomy, it then theoretically has control over its local government units. After all, it should now be the coordinator of development efforts in the region.

 

The ARMM Legislative Assembly as part of its mandate is supposed to enact a regional Local Government Code to further define and enhance autonomy. They did so in 1993. But accordingly, these founding laws (Organic Act and ARMM Local Government Code) are not well-understood by officials or citizens, and they are not fully implemented. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

 

The regional local government code has not been updated to reflect the new organic act (RA 9054) nor is it widely implemented. The LGUs within ARMM still use the 1991 National LGC as their basis. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

 

This overlapping of provisions – that of the Organic Act and the National Local Government Code — has complicated the relationship between the ARMM-RG and its component local government units. Accordingly, “ownership of assets and the level of devolution of authority and powers also vary significantly resulting in complication and confusion not only among end-users but officials as well.” (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005) The end result of this confusion is the blurring of the accountability mechanisms – which institution is to supposed to do what, and who will be held accountable for the failure for service delivery and policy implementation?

 

This is exacerbated by the fact that the regional government of ARMM is treated just like any other local government unit. A comparison of RA 6734 and RA 7160 (Local Government Code of the Philippines) shows that non-ARMM LUG’s are treated on an almost equal footing as the ARMM-RG in terms of expenditure assignment although the functions and responsibilities assigned to the regional government of ARMM are slightly broader than those given to non-ARMM LGUs. For example, the ARMM Regional Government is charged with the provision of agrarian reform and education services, the promotion of employment and workers’ welfare, and the promotion of trade and industry while non-ARMM LGUs are not. (Asian Development Bank and World Bank – Joint Document, 2005)

 

Because the expenditure assignments for the ARMM-RG and non-ARMM local government units are the same, what tasks are left for the local government units within ARMM? The Regional Government has not devolved any of its functions to the LGUs within their jurisdiction even if they could under Organic Act. Thus, ARMM-LGUs do not need to perform devolved functions already given to non-ARMM LGUs under the LGC (Asian Development Bank and World Bank – Joint Document, 2005)

 

This has led the Asian Development Bank (2002) to conclude that service delivery responsibilities have not been fully devolved. Furthermore, the coordination and linkages between ARMM agencies, their national counterparts and local government units within the ARMM are weak, hindering the effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

 

This results in a wait-and-see attitude among those responsible for service delivery. If both the ARMM-RG and the ARMM LGU’s are tasked to deliver a service, and both expect the other to do so, the net effect is that nothing gets accomplished. Aside from this confusion and overlapping of mandates, there is also the question of the capacity of the people who man the ARMM-RG bureaucracy.

 

Human Resource Deployment

 

There has been a steady stream of criticisms levied against the ARMM Regional Government. According to the Asian Development Bank (2002), ARMM is plagued by “inefficient systems and procedures in human resource management, insufficient focus on performance, and a tendency of appointments to be politically-influenced. Regional agencies have limited skills and experience, which limits ability to absorb overseas development assistance.”

 

This weakness is human resource technical capacity has led to the incomplete implementation of the policies and laws that govern the operations of the autonomous region. This weakness is widespread, starting with the officials of the regional government and their staff, and includes the members of the legislative assembly. This latter group is particularly significant since they are tasked with crafting enabling legislation to further operationalize the different laws in ARMM. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

 

There is also the constant refrain that the ARMM regional government is overstaffed. Is this true? If so, what could explain the disproportionately high personnel costs? The chart below shows the distribution of the ARMM-RG budgetary pie.

 

Source: Legislative Budget and Research Management Office, Philippine Senate [Editor's note: Chart not found in the original post.]

 

From 1997 to 2006, the average share of personal services – salaries and wages of the bureaucracy — has been around 70%. Operating costs only account for 16%, and capital outlays at 14%. As mentioned above, the ARMM regional government had to absorb the personnel of 20 devolved line agencies, as well as establish a regional governor’s office, and a regional legislative assembly. This has contributed to the large overhead on personal services.

Aside from that, according to the World Bank, teachers comprise more than 74% of the ARMM-RG workforce. This is followed by ARMM-Department of Health which accounts for 7.5%. This means that more than 80% of civil servants who draw salaries in the ARMM regional government are involved in the basic services of education and health. These are population-sensitive work: the more the population grows, the more you have to hire teachers, doctors, or nurses.

 

As a matter of fact, the Japanese aid agency JICA claims that the personnel from the devolved agencies are not enough to provide for basic services in the entire region. Therefore, ARMM has to hire more people despite the fact that around 70% of its budget already goes to salaries.

 

The ARMM Regional Government then seems to be in a double-bind. It lacks the human resource capabilities and institutional strength to run the now-devolved agencies. But at the same time, the devolved agencies are still pretty much oriented towards Manila, and taking orders from their respective central offices.

 

Funding Autonomy

 

The nature and state of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao is affected by the extent to which the regional government possesses the resources that will make autonomy a viable proposition. While autonomy means that ARMM is now responsible for generating its resources, it is also undeniable that as the poorest region in the country and the site of continued conflicts, it needs more than just status-quo funding.

 

What is needed is massive infusion of resources to bring the region at least at par with the other non-autonomous regions before it is left to its own devices. Pump-priming activities are essential to jump-start economic development. Only then can the fiscal position of ARMM be strong enough for it to stand on its own two feet.

 

A World Bank study in 2005 identifies two unique features which characterize the new mandates for the ARMM regional government:

 

1. Public services already being performed by local government units in other parts of the country are still being performed by the ARMM regional government. 
2. Other services not yet devolved to local government units elsewhere are already being performed by the ARMM regional government (such as education (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005)

 

Thus, ARMM has to fund the cost of a regional governor and a legislative assembly. These items also do not exist in other regions. Aside from that, regional line departments already devolved to ARMM (e.g. ARMM-Department of Education) have a bigger workload than the usual regional administrative offices of national agencies (e.g. Department of Education Region IV office).

A paradox is created because of this. Because of the confusion arising from the mandates of the regional government and the local government code, the local government units within ARMM have been given more resources at their disposal, but they have less responsibilities because what other LGU’s are already doing is assigned to the ARMM Regional Government.

 

It is not surprising that the study concludes “ARMM costs tend to be higher than those in other regions”. Given all these, when compared with other regions, ARMM’s share does not seem commensurate to what it has to fund, as can be seen in the table below.

Comparative Share in Government’s Expenditure (In billion pesos)

NCR, CAR, and Mindanao Regions

Source: Congressional Planning and Budget Department, House of Representatives [Editor's note: This table cannot be found in the original post.]

 

It seems as if ARMM did not receive the pump-priming treatment that was deemed to be so crucial in jump-starting development in the conflict-ridden area. Despite all the additional mandates brought about by devolution and the Organic Act and as discussed above, there is apparently no massive infusion of funds necessary to take care of all the extra mandates that it received. It receives almost the same share as any other region in Mindanao, belying the talk of “pump-priming” and “mini Marshall Plans” for the ARMM.

 

Given this funding situation, it is not surprising that there are many criticisms about the nature of this autonomy. Without the financial wherewithal, can ARMM be truly autonomous?

 

Who Controls the Funds?

 

Aside from the amounts that the ARMM-RG has at its disposal, what is even more crucial is the extent of control over whatever funding is available. According to the Asian Development Bank (2002), ARMM-RG receives around 97% of budget from the national government. This fact alone belies any claims to autonomy, fiscal or otherwise. It is highly unlikely that the ARMM-RG can effect policies on its own, given that it has to seek approval of its budget from national government – just like any other line agency. In fact, other local government units (provinces, cities, municipalities that are not part of ARMM) seem to be in a better position since a certain portion of their funding is released automatically.

 

The dependence of ARMM on national government for its funds is underscored by the fact that the ability of ARMM-LGUs to generate other sources of income and to attract investments is “limited by security concerns, low economic development, and weak institutional systems.” Furthermore, the enacted local revenue code is not fully implemented. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

 

The findings of an INCITEGOV study (2007), as well as the World Bank Joint Social Assessment (2005) publication on the amount of control exercised by the ARMM regional government on their budgets are very revealing. According to the two studies, the ARMM budget is still controlled by national government with 95.2% of the regional budget marked as controlled by national government. The ARMM budget as previously mentioned has to be defended in Congress just like any other regular department.

 

INCITEGOV states that “only a negligible 4% (of ARMM funds)…is completely within the control of (ARMM regional government).” The World Bank report concludes that “the ARMM has no more real or practical autonomy in deciding on the level and allocation of funds intended for its politically distinct mandate than other non-autonomous administrative agencies of national government”.

 

If the ARMM Regional Government has limited resources at its disposal, cannot generate its own resources, and whatever resources it has is not within its control, how do we analyze and evaluate the nature of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao? The only possible answer is this: there is no meaningful and true self-determination for the Muslims, despite all pronouncements to the contrary. It is no wonder then that so many stakeholders in the peace and development efforts are frustrated at the current state of Muslim Mindanao.

 

The Implementation of Shari’ah

 

One of the primary components of the autonomy in ARMM is the degree to which Muslim personal laws – the Shari’ah – are being implemented. Muslim Mindanao will thus have its own legal system over disputes that concern family matters, communal property and other personal matters. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005) This emphasizes the unique nature of Muslim society from the Philippines.

 

The Shari’ah courts are organized into two: the District Courts which preside over matters of inheritance, custody and guardianship, and the Circuit Courts which preside over marriage or divorce. The amended Organic Act (RA 9054) also provides for the creation of the Shari’ah Appellate Court, which is composed of one presiding justice and two associate justices. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005)

 

But from its inception as provided for in the peace agreement, the implementation of Shari’ah was already problematic. There was only 1 paragraph (Article 152) devoted to the Shari’ah system. There were inadequate specifications how the Muslim personal laws would relate to national laws. Further, there were also no provisions on adapting existing Muslim laws to the current situation of Muslims in Mindanao. (Bauzon, 1999)

 

Aside from this lack of context and operationalization, the implementation of Muslim laws also faced significant problems by severe lack of court officials. As of December 21, 2002 there were five Shari’ah district courts and 51 circuit courts. But of these, only one out of the five district courts were filled, and only 32 of the 51 circuit courts had judges. (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 2004)

 

Furthermore, the Appellate Court is yet to be organized, almost a decade after the peace agreement was signed. The courts were also said to have limited geographical coverage, and with a large number of vacancies. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005)

 

In the end, the full implementation of Shari’ah is affected by multiple factors that hamper autonomy, as regards the legal aspect. According to the Joints Need Assessment of the World Bank:

 

“The institutional capacity of the Shari’ah Courts is weak. There is severe lack of physical infrastructure. Deficient court technology, equipment and inadequate budget outlays plague the Shari’ah Courts.” (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005)

 

Conclusion

 

It seems clear then that whatever gains have been made by the signing of the peace agreement in 1996, the subsequent creation of transition mechanisms, and the passage of a new Organic Act to govern Muslim Mindanao, the end-result is something that is surely not what was agreed upon.

 

What obtains in ARMM today is something that does not even come close to autonomy. “To be autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self”. (Christman, 2003)

ARMM does not have control over its resources. It does not have the legal system to address the unique characteristics and requirements of Muslims despite being promised one. It does not even have the capacity – human, technical, bureaucratic — to develop on its own. How can the ARMM – whether through its Regional Government, its local government units, or as a people – pursue its own desires and considerations?

 

Since 1989, we have been calling this region in Mindanao autonomous, and yet, looking at the many studies and analyses done on the critical factors that determine autonomy, it is apparent that this autonomy is, at best, a misnomer. At worst, it is a farcical palliative to defuse further conflicts that may arise if the Muslims realize that what they have been clamoring for has merely been a pipe dream.

 

Autonomy is not the solution to the peace and development problems of Muslim Mindanao. It is, in fact, the precondition for any lasting, meaningful and sustainable peace. Therefore it is essential that all stakeholders – government, MNLF, MILF, civil society, the international community – acknowledge that the assumption is wrong. We cannot advance answers to the so-called “Mindanao problem” if we keep on asking the wrong questions, and if we have preconceived notions of what should be there, but actually is not.

 

Thus, we have to redefine the issue of Muslim Mindanao. We have to question autonomy.

 

 

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