The agreement for a ministerial system of regional government for the Bangsamoro in the GPH-MILF peace agreement has stirred excitement and hope not only in the region but in the whole country. The ministerial system is widely regarded as a political system that could promote democracy and greater citizen participation in the region where clans, dynasties and powerful patrons rule. The ministerial system will also create the policy environment for the development of genuinely principled political parties.

Advocates for the parliamentary system and “real” political parties are excited that if the experimental Bangsamoro ministerial system works, it can serve as a model for the whole country. The sound bite “what is good for the Bangsamoro is good for the country” reflects the thinking that a small scale “enlightened” political system that works in the Bangsamoro can help trigger political reforms that are long sought for in the whole country.

Since the signing of the FAB, there’s been a flurry of initiatives towards assisting groups in the Bangsamoro wanting to form a political party. Special focus was given to the MILF which has publicly announced that it is forming its own political party; the IPs and the women sector.

The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) with the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (IBS) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), have conducted training sessions on party building and development for the MILF. Out of these trainings, 35 were selected as party trainors and organizers and have undergone a trainors’ training course. On the policy level, IAG and KAS had a series of technical sessions with the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) on the options for a ministerial, electoral and political party systems in the Bangsamoro. IAG has also been in discussion with local chief executives in the core territories on these issues.

From these engagements, I make the following observations:

1. The discourse on political parties is closely linked with the issue of Bangsamoro identity and self-determination.

As the assertion of Bangsamoro identity and self-determination intensifies after the signing of the FAB and the annexes, political parties are envisioned as the expression and vehicle for promoting Moro identity and right to self-determination. Proposals have been advanced that frame political parties in the Bangsamoro as indigenous and free from control or influence of Manila. We have been hearing proposals that only regional parties or parties registered and domiciled in the Bangsamoro can participate in regional elections. “Genuinely principled political parties” is interpreted along this line as parties that believe and promote Moro self-determination as the primary Moro agenda free from the power, patronage and influence of the central government and national political parties.

Proponents of this brand of political parties believe that with the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law that is founded primarily on acceptance of the Moro identity, Moro nationalism is the norm as Filipino nationalism is for the rest of the country. Thus, only political parties that embrace Moro nationalism and identity are legitimate political parties.

There are those who find this framing problematic as it is undemocratic. By linking political parties to Bangsamoro identity, it constricts the democratic space which should allow free exchange of ideologies and free association of citizens. In the context of the Bangsamoro, does this framing constrict the formation of political parties by settlers and by non-Moro indigenous peoples? Is there no place in the political arena for those who peacefully advocate that the road to peace and development is integration in the Philippine polity?

The reaction against national political parties dabbling in Moro affairs is understandable from the common belief that there has been no real autonomy in the Moro region because political leadership has always been dictated by Manila leaders. But equating national parties to colonialist policies may not necessarily be accurate considering that there are national parties that advocate for meaningful Bangsamoro autonomy and even the country’s shift to a federal system.

Another problematic issue is whether the requirement that only home-grown political parties can participate in the elections refers not only to regional elections but includes local and congressional elections. Assuming that an interim regional electoral code consistent with a ministerial system is enacted by the BTA for 2016, the question is whether this is applicable only to regional not local elections or even elections for district representatives to Congress. In this case, we will have a complicated political party system where regional political parties can field candidates only for regional posts while national political parties participate in local and congressional elections.

The new Bangsamoro political entity can be meaningful only when it evolves into a coherent political unit consisting of the regional government and its constituent LGUs.   The electoral and political party system must bring about the much needed productive relations between the regional government and LGUs in the Bangsamoro.

As well, the tie that binds the Bangsamoro political entity and the central government is not severed in an autonomous arrangement thus it is imperative that the Bangsamoro government must have a strong and compelling presence in the national scene. Regional political parties must not be isolated from key national political players and agencies to insure that national policies continue to be supportive of the Bangsamoro aspirations.

IAG and KAS are proposing a formula where national parties be allowed to form their own regional parties in the Bangsamoro but these regional political parties must be registered and domiciled in the Bangsamoro and must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from the national parties they are affiliated with.

2. Political Parties eyed to reduce patronage and clan politics in the Bangsamoro.

In policy discussions on political parties in the Bangsamoro, strong sentiments were expressed against political dynasties, patronage and clan politics. As the ministerial system opens the door for broader representation of citizens in the governance of the new Bangsamoro entity, the clamor is for a political party system that is citizen,not patron led. There is a strong voice against political dynasties and banning the formation of clan or family-based political parties.

But this discourse on political dynasties is one of those where people know what they do not like---in this case---political dynasties but they are at a loss on how to address the issue. How do we define political dynasty in the context of the Bangsamoro? The pragmatists among us are counselling restraint as powerful political families hit by any form of anti-political dynasty measure may campaign against the ratification of the Basic Law in the plebiscite.

It is also uncertain whether it is worth waging an anti-dynasty campaign in the Bangsamoro at this time when what can change at least in the short term is the system for electing members of the regional assembly not the system for electing local chief executives. The bastion of political dynasties is in the local government units not the regional government. Besides, the membership of the Bangsamoro Parliament as structured in the power sharing annex already limits any domination of political dynasties as membership is expanded to include sectoral, party list and reserved seats representatives.

For IAG and KAS, the best way to address political dynasties is to have the policy framework where political parties whether based on clans, CSOs, Moro revolutionary fronts, sectors, ethnic groups etc. adopt democratic principles in party and platform building, selection of official candidates and internal party discipline. We have also recommended that instead of district representation in the Parliament, a provincial party list system be adopted in the Bangsamoro that recognizes provincial constituencies even as it promotes the development of principled political parties.

3. Ban on political turncoatism, subsidy to political parties and cap on campaign contributions.

There has been serious discussions on proposals against political turncoatism. One suggestion is to remove from the regional parliament anyone that resigns or dismissed for cause from his or her political party and the party will have to name a replacement from among its ranks. To veer political parties away from single or a few patrons, it has been proposed to put limits on campaign contributions to political parties and some subsidy from the regional government be given to political parties. These proposals are not new as similar measures for strengthening the political party system have been deliberated in Congress. These same proposals are in play in the crafting of the policies for the electoral and political party system in the Bangsamoro.

4. Too much issues for so little time.

The issue of political parties in the Bangsamoro is complex as it is tied with other hard issues such as the ministerial system which is alien to most of us, issue of identity and hard political realities such as clan and warlord politics and political immaturity of citizens. We also have to contend with legal and constitutional issues in crafting the policies for political parties. What is the relationship between the regional electoral code and national elections laws? What is the relationship between the COMELEC which has the constitutional mandate to administer all elections in the country and a Bangsamoro election body if one is constituted? Will the electoral code for the Bangsamoro govern only elections for the Bangsamoro Parliament or all elections in the Bangsamoro? Can regional political parties established pursuant to the regional electoral code participate only in the regional elections or can it field candidates for local and congressional elections?

There is so very little time to sort out these issues. Even with the most optimistic timeline, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) which is envisioned to craft the interim regional electoral code pursuant to the standards and principles in the Basic Law will only have a little over the year to do this. Within this period, genuinely principled political parties have to be organized for the first parliamentary elections in 2016. Unless the transition period is extended, priorities have to be set that at the very least, a ministerial government is in place by 2016 and all other issues will have to be referred to the regional parliament and Congress to resolve later.

Former law dean of Notre Dame University in Cotabato City, Benedicto R. Bacani, is the executive director of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance. Follow him on Twitter @bbacani. Visit his blog here.