The Zamboanga Crisis: Some Searching Notes
- Details
The facts and figures of the humanitarian crisis in Zamboanga City can easily be culled out of reports from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. To date, the number of evacuees has been placed at 126,407 – more than a tenth of the entire population of Zamboanga City – spread out to some 85 evacuation centers. The biggest of these is the Joaquin F. Enriquez Memorial Sports Complex, housing about 70% of the entire evacuee complement. Around these centers are places where food is cooked and prepared en masse for turn over to the evacuation centers. Furthermore, strewn across the city are private homes accommodating households on the run.
Hostages released (i.e., who have managed to escape) number 183 as of the latest count. There is no way of determining the precise number of those who are still in the custody of the MNLF as they take in more as they retreat. It is rumored that these hostages are anywhere between 21 and 50, with a few unable to walk because of wounds. On the other hand, there are those who refuse to be released for fear of snipers.
The combatants on both sides have suffered casualties as well. Killed in action: 12 soldiers and 3 policemen, on one hand, and 86 MNLFs on the other. 103 government forces are reportedly wounded, while 85 of the MNLF have been captured or surrendered.
In the meantime, the President has considered shelling out a staggering amount of nearly PhP 4 Billion to cover housing, education, livelihood, etc.
The following are the result of observations on various aspects of the crisis. We wonder and hope these thoughts are taken in the interest of seeking positive ways forward.
1. Intelligence:
The security sector claims to have possessed intelligence information on the entry of threat elements into Zamboanga City and the massing up of firearms being landed through coastal barangays. These would have easily pointed to the possibility of an attack. Over the last few months, the sale of motorcycles with XRM engines rose so suspiciously high. One hypothesis is that since these engines could also be convertible to pump boat engines, they can give more access and mobility by sea. With this information, what could have been done to forestall the Zamboanga Raids? Late Sunday night, prior to the early Monday raids, men in civvies were uncharacteristically massing up and loitering along the boarding houses of Lustre and other places in Sta. Barbara. They donned their uniforms by early dawn and bore long high powered firearms that had red ribbons tied to their barrels. How could this have been missed?
2. Negotiations:
Day 1 (9 September 2013): Local civil society had suggested options for a more culturally-nuanced approach to negotiation. This would have been represented by a team of negotiators that included members of the Sulu-based Bantay Bayanihan who incidentally were in Zamboanga City to attend a peace forum on the Bantay Bayanihan. These were partners who were doing projects with the MNLF communities and who were familiar with Chairman Misuari and Ustadz Malik. At 4:00 PM, after several attempts to contact the local Crisis Management Committee (CMC), local civil society was met by Mayor Maria Isabelle Climaco at the Claret Lay Formation Center. The offer was made to help with negotiations, with the group requesting for a mandate. The Mayor was non-committal on this and the grant of the mandate was not explored deep enough because she was moving on to a press conference. As she left, she suggested that Fr. Albert Alejo be contacted for details.
Day 2 (10 September 2013): Toward lunch time, the local civil society’s team of potential negotiators sought an audience with the sub-committee on negotiations led by PNP Col. Gucela. Together with them was the Deputy Mufti Ustadz Abdulwakil Tanjilil, representing the Darul Ifta, and other Muslim elders. The local civil society was confident that this team, being Tausug, knew the approach to a fellow Tausug such as Ustadz Malik. They had, in fact, already contacted the latter who agreed to the 6-person composition of the team and who further admonished them to take only one vehicle. They were even provided with the green foot-long sticker labeled “Mediator”.
It was agreed that they would be transparent to Col. Gucela, and that all they needed was a mandate from the Crisis ManagementUnfortunately, the mandate was never given for, as they were about to leave, Fr. Albert Alejo, arrived and took over the negotiation plans with his own approach and his own preferred emissaries. He had the Mayor talk to Ustadz Malik and, later on, Chair Misuari. Local civil society has been marginalized. The rest is history.
Day 6 (14 September 2013): Members of local civil society regrouped to analyze the developing situation and recommend certain potential courses of action for consideration by President Aquino. Towards noon, Fr. Angel Calvo was able arrange for a meeting with DSWD Secretary Dinky Soliman, at 2:00 PM. This was followed by a press conference at which a statement was read by the Interreligious Solidarity for Peace. A reiteration of the statement ensued at DXRZ – Radio Mindanao Network – where Fr. Calvo and Prof. Ali Yacub were further interviewed regarding civil society’s position.
It must be noted that the events in Zamboanga was being monitored by various civil society groups since Day 1. The communication lines of the Mindanao neighborhood had been on fire, with the expressions of outrage and the call for a humanitarian ceasefire gaining momentum to cover like-minded organizations and individuals all over the world. To date, that call has been echoed by over 200 (and counting) local, national, and international groups that include the Mindanao Peaceweavers,
Some lessons:
a. One avoids doing the direct approach of letting the principal (in this case the Mayor) negotiate with the other party. This would place her/him in a compromising situation, leaving no fall backs in case negotiations fell through.
b. Negotiators, if possible, should negotiate in situ. Face-to-face presence can signify goodwill that is bolstered by the calculated willingness to risk danger (hence, the call for a ceasefire), and the possibility of optimizing positive body language (like being able to obtain the release of a few, if not all, hostages).
c. What was the concept of the exchange? What were the choices? What were the practical expectations for the other side to relent? How much value has been placed on life? Not wanting a repeat of Cabatangan was a constant mantra, i.e., no safe conduct pass. Yet the lives of civilian hostages figured much in the dilemma. As the battle approached its 9th day and while many called for accountability and all-out prosecution, some others have begun to consider conditions that would have diminished the destruction to life and property, and limited the number of IDPs.
d. Culture and Language: The happy discovery that Ustadz Malik spoke Chabacano could not substitute for the bonding of Tausug speakers. Further, there are words that are NOT directly spoken, and euphemisms may be sought in lieu of terms like “surrender” which – we are told - is not in Tausug lexicon; an understanding of “maltabat” and “sipug”; even the extreme possibility of the “sabil” in a vow to the finish. In 2006, when over 200 members of local and international civil society and the Mindanao Peaceweavers went to Sulu for a solidarity mission on the Centennial of the Bud Daho Massacre, the terms “reconciliation”, “healing”, seemed to have no exact meaningful equivalents in Tausug. A sensitivity to the cultural nuances of the negotiations would have been more likely for those native to Sulu.
3. The Peace Process and Revisiting OPAPP’s Role:
If there is anything that has drawn the Zamboangueño mind to the peace process, it is this crisis. But what is the peace process? Qualifying the peace process as the job of OPAPP only and the shift to Level 4 and the consequent relinquishment of responsibility to the National CMC, has…
a. Forced the OPAPP to explain what it was doing, its confusion over Misuari’s inconsistencies and mixed messages, and that the government was not remiss In its peace efforts. The constant interviews on radio and television would dish out stereotyped arguments that people have long heard, in tones that clearly showed OPAPP’s defensive attitude.
b. Given the notion that the peace process is not a local – but a national – concern. Hence, in conclusion, locals need not bother with it. Even the Chair of the local CMC qualified the limits of her responsibility, and that did not include the peace process. While technically the peace process is OPAPP’s stuff, the opportunity to familiarize the local citizenry on it has been missed in favor of the call of the moment and the declaration of “calibrated military action”. Clearly, the crisis has driven a wedge between Muslim and Christian communities. Considering the Muslim-Christian divide that has deepened, turning to civil society may have helped. It was observed, though, that only a specific clique of civil society organizations were welcome to read statements at city hall.
c. Led to difficult questions of whether OPAPP remains to be an effective instrument for working for the peace process, or whether it has to revisit its mandate of dealing with particular segments of Moro leadership (like the MILF, with the FAB and its annexes) through their own roadmap, or the ICC and Sema segments of the MNLF); or whether or not it pushes more assertively for a fusion of these different Moro groups, convince their leaders to move out of their comfort zones, soften their differences, and courageously rise up to the moral high ground of working for the Bangsamoro people. While this is easier said than done, many see that unless this is done, peace will never be attained. We shall need to think out of the box.
4. The Role of Media
One cannot overemphasize the role of media in their call for support and “Zamboanga Hermosa” advocacy. In these days of the beleaguered homeland, it is even an obligation to do so. However, the use of media for incendiary purposes (e.g., the call to arm, “bring out your arms and defend Zamboanga”), intensifies the tension and gets people to miss the point about the violent events.
There is also the need to balance mis/dis-information with the realities on the ground. Text messages flying thick and fast - about sightings in some coastal areas and bomb threats in various places of Zamboanga Peninsula and Basilan – drive people to paranoia and to various acts of desperation.
5. IPSP and Bantay Bayanihan: Where do we draw the lines of engagement for Bantay Bayanihan (BB) as it has been acknowledged to be a partner of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Internal Peace and Security Program (IPSP)?Zamboanga Crisis was a test for its implementation. We were not remiss in calling attention to the need for “talking”. Amidst the burning of the houses, our interlocutors were in no mood to meet us, and even exhorted us to “forget Bantay Bayanihan”. The relevance of the IPSP-BB partnership is weighed against extreme encounters like this, and when push comes to shove, the military will exercise what it does best – fire the gun ostensibly under the orders of the commander-in-chief.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:
1. Divergence rather than convergence: The use of a variety of approaches and giving place to as many actors to work on certain segments of a problem will allow more surface area for action. These days’ buzzword of “inclusiveness” must apply.
2. The peace mode: Local and external civil society’s call for humanitarian ceasefire was not met with approval because of what the local leadership and the population felt as the call for justice and accountability. Given the dilemma of life vs. the MNLF’s safe conduct pass, it would still have been the military option, no matter whether the negotiations could have possibly nipped this catastrophe in the bud. Local society was pushed to the wall on this one. The Mayor’s being pressured to come on top of the situation and enforce the law saw through her sad face. People were literally calling for the blood of the MNLF – the group that has inflicted wanton havoc on our city. Where then is the place of peace in these circumstances? Ever?
3. The call to violence: What drives a group of people to violence? A cause that is larger than life, like hulah, bangsa, agama? A need that is rumored to be answered by PhP 10,000? A friendly walk around the prime city of Western Mindanao, with one’s flag unfurled at its city hall? The values of reciprocity and equivalence where beneficence is practiced toward a kin or a friend and, conversely, pain and annihilation on an enemy? Who is the enemy? What about collateral damage?
4. Trust and confidence: With confidence at an all time low, who is there to trust? The Zamboanga crisis has tested the leadership of so many, from the national leaders, to the mayor, to barangay leaders, to intellectuals who purport to know what peace means. We take heart in leaders who have descended from their high horses to minister to the sick and wounded, who have donned the apron to cook for the hordes of evacuees, who have served as grub leaders for their displaced communities. Still we seek leaders with no doubtful agenda… leaders we can trust.
5. Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, Rule of Law: On a massive basis, the use of human shields, holding people against their choice, the segregation of men and women in some evacuation centers, forced evacuation (except for reasons of civilian protection in anticipation of military action), deprivation of food, shelter, clothing; the prospect of being homeless and disempowered, have markedly raised the consciousness of this community to human rights, the rule of law, and the international humanitarian law. The politics of the everyday, the regular, and the ordinary do not as dramatically command this much attention. But these are now longed for, as normal activities - classes, basic services, and business and economic pursuits - are driven to a halt. It is bad enough that floods and typhoons can get masses of people displaced. It is cruel and obscene that human depravities trigger this.
CALL TO ACTION:
At this point, the thoughts of Jules Benitez are worth sharing:
“Let's channel our anger, tears and frustrations towards a definitive action.
These, the national and city governments, owe us, the residents of Zamboanga City:
1. The truth surrounding the armed violence wrought by the AFP and theMNLF;
2. Indemnification for all the civilian victims of the violence.
These, the civil society groups must immediately act on:
1. Organize a fact-finding mission to render an impartial account of theZamboanga September Violence;
2. Documentation of all civilian victims and push for the indemnification of allvictims;
3. Craft Early Recovery Program for all the communities directly affected bythe armed violence and pursue such program with the government andnon-government development agencies;
4. Push for the immediate reconstruction of all damaged social services and infrastructures.
The City Government, henceforth must:
1. Establish program to strengthen inter-cultural understanding and solidarity;
2. Establish a system for barangay-based community security planning;
3. Enforce strict gun ban in the city.
4. Establish open and diplomatic communication lines between the city and the MNLF and MILF.”
Grace Jimeno-Rebollos is a university professor, former president of Western Mindanao State University, and regional convenor for the Western Mindanao Cluster of Bantay Bayanihan.