

August 2020



INSTITUTE FOR  
AUTONOMY AND  
GOVERNANCE

# POLICY REPORT

## Emerging Issues on Cabinet Bill No. 60: Bangsamoro Administrative Code

This Policy Report was developed by IAG Senior Fellow Atty. Michael Henry Yusingco, LL.M, from the experts' discussions convened under the program "Political Party Building and Development in the Bangsamoro" implemented by IAG in partnership with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) with support from the government of the United Kingdom. Views do not reflect the official position of WFD and the UK government.

In partnership with:



WESTMINSTER  
FOUNDATION FOR  
DEMOCRACY

Supported by:



UK Government

## Summary

The key points of this policy report are:

- The BOL is a mini-constitution for the BARMM in relation to the Bangsamoro Administrative Code. Therefore, as a rule it should not simply repeat the provisions of the BOL. But it certainly cannot go beyond the spirit and letter of the organic law. Obviously, the code must exhibit specific mechanisms and principles mandated by the BOL.

- The establishment of the Bangsamoro Parliament begins essentially from scratch. This means the BTA plays such a huge part in setting the tone for the Bangsamoro Parliament. The BOL provided the skeletal parliamentary framework but the BTA bears the privilege of initiating the process of creating the democratic ethos of the Bangsamoro Parliament. And part of this huge task lies in the enactment of the administrative code.

- Apart from particular provisions of the BOL, the process of drafting an administrative code for the BARMM is contingent on peculiar factors which the BTA must consider. They are not explicitly provided in the BOL, but they are necessary considerations in any parliamentary building project.

- I. The Bangsamoro Administrative Code must reflect a parliamentary democratic structure.

- II. Is there a need for a Sunset Clause?

- III. Legislative process must reflect parliamentary democracy.

- The draft Bangsamoro Administrative Code filed with the BTA/Parliament is an excellent starting point for public deliberations. It is clearly a sincere attempt to provide a comprehensive governance framework for the BARMM. This policy report on Cabinet Bill No. 60 highlights the following points for consideration.

- I. Must reflect a parliamentary structure.

- II. A leaner Office of the Chief Minister.

- III. Re-articulating presidential power of supervision over the BARMM.

- IV. On parliamentary oversight and the Cabinet.

- V. Establishing a Professional Parliamentary Bureaucracy.

- The challenge for the BTA is to derive the parliamentary features well-suited for the Bangsamoro context. But the temptation to copy from the national structure is a concern because it can lead the BTA away from the parliamentary system mandated by the BOL. Obviously, this must be consciously avoided by the BTA.

## Introduction

The ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) established the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).

The creation of the BARMM also marks the end of decades of armed conflict between Muslim insurgents and the government. Understandably, the inauguration of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), tasked to govern the region during the 3-year transition period, was heralded as a “new dawn” for Mindanao.

The BTA in its first year of work has demonstrated the resolve to create a stable economic environment for the BARMM. Indeed, three items in their list of achievements for 2019 bodes particularly well for the economic prospects of the autonomous region.

The first one is the holding of the Bangsamoro Energy Forum which initiated efforts to develop sustainable energy sources in the region. Second, the holding of the Bangsamoro Tourism Stakeholders’ Summit which signified the importance of tourism in grassroots development in the region. And third, a high investment record for the BARMM which indicates growing business confidence for the region.

Ostensibly, the status of the BARMM as the poorest region in the country could dramatically change within the decade if the BTA continues laying down a strong foundation for the first elected Bangsamoro Parliament in 2022. Pertinently, a vital piece of this undertaking is the enactment of fundamental codes, with the Bangsamoro Administrative Code as arguably one of the more crucial legislation the BTA must pass.

Last July 22, Cabinet Bill No. 60 entitled An Act Providing for the Bangsamoro Administrative Code was filed in the BTA/Parliament. This policy report offers an analysis of this bill.

Administrative law pertains to the legal framework within which public administration is carried out. It generally covers the organization of duties and functions of public authorities and their relations with one another and with citizens. In short, an administrative code regulates or controls the administrative organization and operations of government.

Pertinently, the Bangsamoro Administrative Code must reflect the basic framework of the Bangsamoro government established by the BOL. The BOL is a mini-constitution for the BARMM in relation to the Bangsamoro Administrative Code. Therefore, as a rule it should not simply repeat the provisions of the BOL. But it certainly cannot go beyond the spirit and letter of the

organic law. Obviously, the code must exhibit specific mechanisms and principles mandated by the BOL.

First and foremost, the BOL (Section 3 of Article IV) provides, “The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall have a parliamentary form of government.” Hence, the Bangsamoro Administrative Code must reflect a parliamentary structure of government.

Worth noting that the envisaged Bangsamoro Parliament does not mirror the form of government at the national level. Such an oddity given that by and large, other subnational governments in Southeast Asia are simply copies of their national governments. For instance, state governments in Malaysia are parliamentary in form like the federal government. But the Bangsamoro regional government is mandated by law to be parliamentary in form even though the Philippine national government is presidential.

However, it must be noted as well that this asymmetry is intentional. The BARMM was purposely designed in the BOL to be “different” from the national unitary presidential structure, which incidentally the previous Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) government also reflected. As one member of the BTA exclaimed, the BARMM must not be like the ARMM!

Ostensibly, the establishment of the Bangsamoro Parliament begins essentially from scratch. This means the BTA plays such a huge part in setting the tone for the Bangsamoro Parliament. The BOL provided the skeletal parliamentary framework but the BTA bears the privilege of initiating the process of creating the democratic ethos of the Bangsamoro Parliament. And part of this huge task lies in the enactment of the administrative code.

The overarching guidepost for the Bangsamoro Administrative Code is found in Section 2 of Article VII of the BOL which mandates that, “The powers of government shall be vested in the Parliament which shall exercise those powers and functions expressly granted to it in this Organic Law, and those necessary for, or incidental to, the proper governance and development of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.”

Additionally, the code must also be guided by these two provisions:

“Section 3. Legislative Authority. – The Parliament shall have the authority to enact laws on matters that are within the powers and competencies of the Bangsamoro Government.

Section. 4. Executive Authority. – The executive function and authority shall be exercised by the Cabinet which shall be headed by a Chief Minister. The Chief Minister shall be elected by a

majority vote of all the members of the Parliament.

The Chief Minister shall nominate two (2) Deputy Chief Ministers who shall be elected by the Parliament, as provided for in Section 35 of this Article, and appoint the members of the Cabinet, majority of whom shall come from the Parliament.”

The last two provisions very clearly reflect a parliamentary structure of government. Consequently, the Bangsamoro Administrative Code must provide a detailed organizational and operational structure for the Bangsamoro Parliament and the Cabinet. However, as for how the Bangsamoro Parliament conducts its legislative work, that will have to be determined by the Bangsamoro Parliament itself through its Parliamentary Rules of Procedure.<sup>1</sup> Palpably, popular initiative within the BARMM warrants its own act of parliament as mandated by the BOL.

The discussion below covers two parts. The first part outlines three key factors which the BTA should consider in drafting an administrative code for the BARMM. The second part enumerates five points about Cabinet Bill No. 60 which hopefully can help in the framing of the BTA’s deliberation process.

## **KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DRAFTING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE**

Apart from the aforementioned provisions of the BOL, the process of drafting an administrative code for the BARMM is contingent on peculiar factors which the BTA must consider. They are not explicitly provided in the BOL, but they are necessary considerations in any parliamentary building project.

### **I. The Bangsamoro Administrative Code must reflect a parliamentary democratic structure.**

The administrative code in prescribing the organization and operation of the Bangsamoro Parliament must reflect two vital components of parliamentary democracy:

#### **1. Separation of Powers**

In a presidential system, the executive and legislative branches of government are very clearly separated. But in a parliamentary system this division becomes blurred because the executive

---

<sup>1</sup> Presently this is the Parliamentary Rules, Procedures, and Practices of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

branch is also part of the legislative branch, cabinet members being members of the parliament as well. Therefore, in designing the operational framework of the Bangsamoro Parliament the BTA must be very conscious about executive–legislative balance of power.

There is no dispute as to the need to establish an effective Cabinet to guide the region during the transition period. But meeting this requirement does not mean weakening the Bangsamoro Parliament. The domination of one side over the other must be avoided. But the capability of one to check on the other must be maintained, if not strengthened.

## **2. System of Responsible Government**

The BTA must keep in mind that the executive branch in a parliamentary system is directly accountable to the parliament. Meaning, each cabinet minister can be held to account by the parliament concerning his assigned portfolio. In the Westminster model for example, the process of keeping the government of the day or the cabinet accountable is called the Question Hour, where other members of the parliament are given the chance to interrogate the Prime Minister and other Ministers on current policies being implemented.

Note that floor debates are likewise an opportunity for members of parliament to discuss government policy, proposed new laws and current issues. It allows them to voice the concerns and interests of their constituents. More importantly, debates are designed to assist members of parliament to reach an informed decision on a given subject. With or without this parliamentary mechanics, parliament as a whole must still keep the government of the day accountable to it at all times. In fact, scrutinizing the executive is a role every parliamentarian should play.

A corollary of the principle of responsible government is the principle of ministerial responsibility which means that ministers should be responsible for the actions and decisions of the government departments they lead. This aims to encourage ministers to keep a close check on their department’s activities. Ministers are also expected to answer questions and be accountable for the actions of their departments. In other words, the buck stops with the minister involved, not his staff or anybody else.

## **II. Is there a need for a Sunset Clause?**

Given the fact that the BTA already functions as a parliament, theoretically therefore, the Bangsamoro Administrative Code it enacts can persist beyond the transition period. Nonetheless, the said code can also provide a sunset clause. Meaning, it can specifically have a self-repealing clause to take effect upon the assumption of the first elected Bangsamoro

Parliament in 2022.

The inclusion of a sunset clause raises a concern though. If indeed such an administrative code will only be functional during the transition period, then it would be advisable to keep it as simple and lean as possible. Meaning, let it cover only the most basic governmental structures in the executive side to meet fiscal and budgetary requirements set by the BOL. Correspondingly, the BTA can just let the BOL stand as the legal framework for other matters in the regional government during the transition period. The BTA can always address or supplement governance gaps that may arise with specific legislation (i.e. Bangsamoro Attorney General's Office under Bangsamoro Autonomy Act No. 5).

However, it must be noted that the first elected Bangsamoro Parliament possess the power to amend or repeal and replace any administrative code, any code for that matter, enacted by the BTA.

### **III. Legislative process must reflect parliamentary democracy**

As previously mentioned, the BTA functions as a parliament. Needless to say, the enactment of the Bangsamoro Administrative Code must already exemplify parliamentary democracy. While the exigency of passing the BOL-mandated codes cannot be avoided, the draft bills must nevertheless be subjected to proper public consultations and parliamentary deliberations.

Given the limitations imposed by current quarantine measures, the BTA can utilize its strong online presence to solicit comments and insights from the Bangsamoro community by issuing a call for submissions in the government portal. This will give the Bangsamoro community the opportunity to engage in the legislative process. Notably, the BTA has already been streaming parliamentary sessions online. Continuing this during the deliberations on the draft codes can facilitate public scrutiny of these proposed legislation.

Worth noting that this mandate to engage the Bangsamoro community is found in Section 3 of Article IV of the BOL, "The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall have a democratic political system that allows its people to freely participate in the political processes within its territorial jurisdiction."

## **POINTS TO CONSIDER ABOUT CABINET BILL NO. 60**

The draft Bangsamoro Administrative Code filed with the BTA/Parliament is an excellent starting point for public deliberations. It is clearly a sincere attempt to provide a comprehensive governance framework for the BARMM. This policy brief does not have enough space to show an exhaustive analysis. A critical study of Cabinet Bill No. 60, however, highlights the following points for consideration.

### **I. Must reflect a parliamentary structure**

The bill is patently influenced by Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 and Muslim Mindanao Act No. 287, the administrative code during the ARMM regime. This explains the broad unitary structure evident in the bill.

Additionally, this proposed legislation obviously focused on establishing the organizational and operation framework of the Office of the Chief Minister and the Cabinet. Most of its provisions on the Bangsamoro Parliament are simply culled directly from the BOL.

Notably, one of its declared principles states, “The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao is an autonomous region with asymmetrical relationship with the Republic of the Philippines and with a parliamentary form of government. Its political system is democratic that allows its people to freely participate in the political processes within its territorial jurisdiction;” (Section 3 (a) of the Introductory Provisions)

But the notion of “asymmetry” is palpably absent because the government structure evident in the proposed bill is closely similar to the presidential unitary structure of the ARMM. Note for instance the provision granting the Chief Minister the Power of Control over the entire Cabinet, “As Head of the Bangsamoro Government, the Chief Minister shall have control of all ministries, agencies, offices, bureaus, commissions, boards and instrumentalities of the Bangsamoro Government. The Chief Minister shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed.” (Section 1, Chapter 1, Title 1 of Book IV).

This power is a hallmark of a presidential structure and almost non-existent in a parliamentary system. As previously mentioned, the ministers are primarily responsible for their assigned portfolio and are ultimately accountable to the parliament. Indeed, the Prime Minister, First Minister, or Chief Minister, whatever the designation may be, is deemed “primus inter pares” or the first amongst equals. Hence, this grant of the power of control over the entire Cabinet to the Chief Minister in the bill seem out of place in a purported parliamentary structure.



## **II. A leaner Office of the Chief Minister**

The rationale for establishing a parliamentary structure in the BARMM is to do away with the natural tendency to create unitary-style strongman rule in the region. Indeed, the BOL envisions an evidently more collective and collaborative governance culture in the BARMM through the Bangsamoro Parliament.

The bill, however, centralizes executive authority in the Office of the Chief Minister. As previously mentioned, it grants the Chief Minister the power of control over the entire Cabinet. This power is taken to an even higher level by the Chief Minister's power to appoint almost all top officials in the executive bureaucracy.<sup>2</sup> (See for instance Section 7, Chapter 3, Title 1 of Book IV)

The Chief Minister even has Rule Making Power (Chapter 2, Title 1 of Book IV). This is apparently a revival of one of the powers of the old ARMM regional governor. While the head of the cabinet in a parliamentary system certainly has the authority to issue directives or communiques within the executive, the rule making power is almost always reserved to the parliament. Granting this power to the Chief Minister puts the office in a much-elevated status than his parliamentary post would traditionally be.

More crucially, the bill places almost all the offices and agencies under the ambit of the Office of the Chief Minister. From Deputy Ministers, to Senior Ministers, to officials in offices such as the Cabinet Secretariat, Internal Audit Office, to various boards and councils, all fall under the authority of the Office of the Chief Minister. Again, this move is reminiscent of the old ARMM with its bloated bureaucracy. Curiously, this was one of the reasons why the ARMM was universally derided as a "failed experiment".

## **III. Re-articulating presidential power of supervision over the BARMM**

The President's oversight power over the BARMM is clearly provided in Article X, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution, "The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed."

This prescription must be properly articulated in the Bangsamoro Administrative Code because Section 2 of Article V of the BOL provides, "Subject to Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and this Organic Law, the Bangsamoro Government shall exercise its authority

---

<sup>2</sup> Last June 25, 2020, the BTA-Parliament approved Cabinet Bill No. 46 entitled, "An act defining the power of appointment in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao". It is not clear how the draft administrative code impacts this enactment.

over the following matters without prejudice to the general supervision of the President of the Republic of the Philippines.”<sup>3</sup>

Accordingly, the administrative code must provide a clear prescription on the interaction of the Bangsamoro government and national government agencies acting in behalf of the President. This is especially important as it can facilitate cooperation and coordination between the two levels of government. Worth noting that an institutionalized mechanism that fosters efficient interaction between the Bangsamoro government and the central government is vital to the BARMM’s economic development aspirations.

Moreover, Section 1 of Article V provides, “All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by the Constitution or by national law to the Bangsamoro Government shall be vested in the National Government.” Therefore, the Bangsamoro Administrative Code should have a provision stating that all laws enacted by the Bangsamoro Parliament are presumed to be within the powers granted to it by the BOL and the 1987 Constitution unless otherwise proved. Indeed, this should be the default principle of the Bangsamoro government (both legislative and executive) to avoid the possibility of these powers reverting to the national government on the grounds of failing to use or assert them.

The bill, however, has no provision concerning these matters.

#### **IV. On parliamentary oversight and the Cabinet**

As previously mentioned, in a parliamentary structure, the cabinet or the government of the day shall be accountable to the parliament. This means all ministers, including the top one, cannot avoid parliamentary scrutiny over their actions.

The bill however has adopted a variation of the principle of qualified political agency, which is also a hallmark of a presidential system, in Section 1, Chapter 1 of Book IV, “The acts of the Bangsamoro Cabinet members performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Minister, presumptively executive acts.”

This provision implies that the Chief Minister can overturn or change a decision made by a minister in the performance of his function. This power is inconsistent with the parliamentary convention of ministerial responsibility. As earlier asserted, in a parliamentary system, a minister is ultimately responsibly for his assigned portfolio and is consequently answerable to

---

<sup>3</sup> Section 2 of Article V of the BOL enumerates the power of the Bangsamoro Government.

the parliament in the performance of his office. In a way, this provision in the bill diminishes the power of oversight of the Bangsamoro Parliament over the actions of ministers in the Cabinet.

Moreover, the provision that requires Cabinet ministers to periodically submit reports to the Chief Minister and not to the Bangsamoro Parliament can also be seen as a diminution of the latter's oversight authority over Cabinet ministers. While there is nothing innately wrong for ministers to keep the Chief Minister apprised of all the happenings in the various ministries, the strength of a parliamentary structure will be rendered nugatory by giving the Chief Minister the authority to override ministers.

Worth noting that governance in a parliamentary system is marked by a diffusion of power, even executive power, which is the ideal aspired for by the BOL. In contrast, governance in a presidential system, which all Filipinos know very well, is marked by a concentration of power on a singular office or individual, a set-up which the BOL has deliberately forsaken.

## **V. Establishing a Professional Parliamentary Bureaucracy**

Notably, the parliaments of Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, and Singapore all have non-partisan professional staff to support its operations. Governance in the modern era has become so complex and multifaceted that to be truly effective, governments now must have professional civil servants in place, a cohort who are not dependent on the ebb and flow of the transfer of political power.

Indeed, the administration of government cannot be driven by politicians and their supporters alone. Good governance also demands the existence of an apolitical bureaucracy that keeps the engines of government humming constantly and consistently. Therefore, the “palakasan” system prevalent in the ARMM must have no room in the BARMM.

In this regard, the regional administrative code must create a professional bureaucracy to support the Cabinet, but one that is manifestly and completely independent of the various ministers' offices, including the Office of the Chief Minister. The code must also establish an apolitical and permanent bureaucracy to support the Bangsamoro Parliament, one which is distinctly autonomous from the ever-changing class of elected members.

The proposed legislation however does not establish a professional and apolitical bureaucracy. On the contrary, as previously discussed, it creates a significantly expanded executive bureaucracy that is completely under the control and supervision of the Chief Minister. Indeed, it is only natural to be anxious that such a set-up would again be susceptible to the patronage

system that afflicted the ARMM. Notably, the bill has nothing to offer regarding the creation of civil service support to the Bangsamoro Parliament.

## **Conclusion**

This policy report has offered a condensed analysis of the draft Bangsamoro Administrative Code. Needless to say, the ultimate hope here is for the analysis to contribute in the discussions and deliberations in and outside of the BTA/Parliament about Cabinet Bill No. 60.

For the reasons discussed in this policy report, it is recommended that the BTA consider a revision of this proposed legislation in order to enact an administrative code that is more in line with the mandates of the BOL, specifically on establishing a parliamentary system in the BARMM.

For instance, the “right to initiate legislation” rule in Section 16, Title III of Book III should be reconsidered because this rule, by giving the government of the day the exclusive right to initiate legislation, effectively limits the power of the parliament to enact laws. The Cabinet certainly has the privilege to dictate the legislative agenda of the Bangsamoro Parliament, but this rule undercuts the very *raison d’être* of an elected parliament which is to give each elected member the opportunity to propose legislation in the name of their respective constituencies. Arguably, this unusual set-up created by the bill has no imprimatur in the BOL.

In this regard, the BTA should ensure the deliberations on this proposed legislation is opened to more stakeholders. The Bangsamoro community is entitled to offer their views on highly contentious issues such as the true meaning of “moral governance”. For if indeed this idea is to be part of the administrative code, then the Bangsamoro community must have a firm understanding of how this standard should impact governance in the BARMM.

Furthermore, the question of whether it would be more prudent to exclude the Bangsamoro justice system and the Intergovernmental (IGR) bodies from the scope of the administrative code should be addressed by a wider forum. These are two innovations in the BOL which the Bangsamoro community needs to fully comprehend as well. Dedicating individual legislation for the Bangsamoro justice system and IGR instead would ensure the right focus is given to these matters by the BTA and the Bangsamoro community.

As previously discussed, the Bangsamoro community must also have their say in the very lifespan of this piece of regional legislation. The BTA must get their views on whether or not the administrative code should apply only during the transition period because this decision will

also affect the fiscal position of the BARMM.

Finally, the Bangsamoro community needs to be involved in the streamlining of the BARMM bureaucracy. Harkening to the call that the BARMM must not be a repeat of the ARMM, the BTA must rethink the bill's creation of a big bureaucracy that is inherently vulnerable to patronage politics. Needless to say, the creation of a professional and apolitical bureaucracy in the BARMM depends as well on the enactment of the Bangsamoro Civil Service Code. In this regard, the BTA must ensure there is coherent synergy between the two codes.

In the same vein, the Bangsamoro Administrative Code must likewise cohere with the Bangsamoro Local Government Code in dealing with the relationship of the regional government to local governments in the BARMM. More accurately, this will entail establishing an intergovernmental framework involving the Bangsamoro government, the local government, and the national government.

In sum, the BTA holds a blank canvass in relation to the drafting of a Bangsamoro Administrative Code. For this reason, it is unavoidable to rely on external examples for benchmarking. It is certainly appropriate to look into how the Westminster model works in the United Kingdom and Australia and how the Western European model operates in Switzerland and Germany. Of course, the challenge for the BTA is to derive the parliamentary features well-suited for the Bangsamoro context. But the temptation to copy from the national structure is a concern because it can lead the BTA away from the parliamentary system mandated by the BOL. Obviously, this must be consciously avoided by the BTA.

## REFERENCES

Anika Gauja, 'Party Reform: The Causes, Challenges, and Consequences of Organizational Change', Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2016.

Caspar F. van den Berg, 'Strategic Planning for Political Parties: A Practical Tool', International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA).

Edward C. Weeks, 'The Practice of Deliberative Democracy: Results from Four Large-Scale Trials', *Public Administration Review* • July/August 2000, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp360-372.

Enrico Borghetto and Federico Russo, 'From agenda setters to agenda takers? The determinants of party issue attention in times of crisis', *Party Politics*, 2018, Vol. 24(1), pp65–77.

Freek Vermeulen, November 08, 2017, 'Many Strategies Fail Because They're Not Actually Strategies', *Harvard Business Review* accessible at <https://hbr.org/2017/11/many-strategies-fail-because-theyre-not-actually-strategies>

Juan L. Linz, 'The Virtues of Parliamentarism', *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 1, Number 4, Fall 1990, pp.84-91.

Nic Cheeseman, Juan Pablo Luna, et al, 'Politics Meets Policies: The Emergence of Programmatic Political Parties', International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA).

Paul D. Hutchcroft (editor), 'Strong Patronage, Weak Parties: The Case for Electoral System Redesign in the Philippines', Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2019.

Peter Burnell, 'Building Better Democracies: Why political parties matter', Westminster Foundation for Democracy, December 2004.

Quinton Mayne , Jorrit de Jong, and Fernando Fernandez-Monge, 'State Capabilities for Problem-Oriented Governance', *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, 2020, pp33–44.

The Conversation, 'Why women leaders are excelling during the coronavirus pandemic', May 13, 2020 accessible at <https://theconversation.com/why-women-leaders-are-excelling-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic-138098>.

‘A Framework for Democratic Party-Building’, The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy The Hague, 2004.

‘A Guide to Political Party Development’, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2008.

‘Reforming the Philippine Political Party System: Ideas and Initiatives, Debates and Dynamics’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 2009.

Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports Concerning Political Parties, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (VENICE COMMISSION), Strasbourg, 15 March 2016.

Parameters on the Relationship Between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: A Checklist, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (VENICE COMMISSION), Strasbourg, 24 June 2019.

**Online resources:**

[http://www.openculture.com/2020/06/noam-chomsky-explains-the-best-way-for-ordinary-people-to-make-change.html?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3A+OpenCulture+%28Open+Culture%29&fbclid=IwAR2lvYBaL-F12QBevE9RQqjsLYYNi8xPufR7K7clvjbO\\_OOcR-miUmyal\\_o](http://www.openculture.com/2020/06/noam-chomsky-explains-the-best-way-for-ordinary-people-to-make-change.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+OpenCulture+%28Open+Culture%29&fbclid=IwAR2lvYBaL-F12QBevE9RQqjsLYYNi8xPufR7K7clvjbO_OOcR-miUmyal_o)

<https://peo.gov.au/understand-our-parliament/parliament-and-its-people/people-in-parliament/political-parties/>

[https://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Senate/Powers\\_practice\\_n\\_procedures/pops/Papers\\_on\\_Parliament\\_67/Party\\_Reform](https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/pops/Papers_on_Parliament_67/Party_Reform)

<https://www.moadoph.gov.au/blog/let-s-get-this-party-started-starting-your-own-political-party-in-australia/#>

<https://theconversation.com/what-is-a-party-platform-and-why-do-candidates-often-ignore-them-62595>

<http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p77961/pdf/ch0165.pdf>

<https://www.vic.gov.au/guidelines-appearing-commonwealth-parliamentary-committees>

[https://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Parliamentary\\_Departments/Parliamentary\\_Library/pubs/rp/rp0001/01RP13](https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0001/01RP13)

<https://www.fedcourt.gov.au/digital-law-library/judges-speeches/chief-justice-allsop/allsop-cj-20190404>







INSTITUTE FOR  
AUTONOMY AND  
GOVERNANCE

In partnership with:



WESTMINSTER  
FOUNDATION FOR  
DEMOCRACY

Supported by:

 UK Government