ISSUE/ QUESTION

RESPONSE

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS / COMMITMENTS

Cerilles: (Manifestation) The Governor of Zamboanga del Sur is asking for a public hearing in Pagadian.

Rodriguez: Request approved. We will schedule a public hearing in Pagadian.

Pagadian Public Hearing to be scheduled.

Biazon: This bill is probably the one that called for extensive hearings, and it is in these hearings that we have encountered many identities to deal with. We have at hand so many interests, most of them conflicting. It is a question of how to reconcile them— ancestral domain, land ownership, equitable distribution of political representation, ethnic concerns, administration of justice under the Sharia. The Bangsamoro is not just a group of people but a form of government. We may need to examine the question of compromise, except on the compromise of the constitutionality of the law.

Lobregat: The reason for the conflicting views is the improper consultations that were conducted. I would rather harmonize these conflicting views rather than compromise.

Biazon: The proposed BBL should have been submitted in March, but it has to be cleansed of its unconstitutionality so it had undergone renegotiations, hence it was submitted 5 months later. We do not want what happened to the MOA-AD to happen to the BBL.

De Lima: The Secretary of Justice is an alter ego of the president, and thus, we are in full support of the passage of the BBL. The BBL proves that we [Filipinos] are not a slave to enmity. The BBL outlines the solutions to the problems. We believe the BBL fulfills the aspirations of the people and complies with the spirit and letter of the Constitution.

De Lima: Atty. Silva will further elaborate on the specific provisions that concern the DOJ.

DOJ will submit position paper

Silva: DOJ believes that the following articles are consistent with the Constitution— Article 10, Section 13; Article 14, Section 17. In Article 10, Section 20, Congress can allocate which laws that the Bangsamoro Parliament can pass; it is sufficiently comprehensive for Congress to determine which areas of law may be legislated by the latter. We must look at the structures that implement these norms. It is of course withour prejudice t the opinion of the Supreme Court. We cannot afford another MOA-AD.

Magallona: There are two actions in the political system which requires an act of sovereignty by the people— the promulgation of the Constitution, and the distribution of state powers. The act of Congress of amending the Constitution is not proper for contractual stipulation. The content of the BBL finds its substance in the reorganization of powers. The consequence of this is that its measure is not in the regular course of amending the Constitution. The reorganization and fragmentation of powers pertain to the power of the people through the constitutional commission. The BBL is a constitutional reform. Under the Constitution, the ARMM is to be governed by a national act but is subject to national laws and the Constitution. Here there are two tiers of legislative process— the national laws and the organic act. My proposal is that the BBL be formulated into an appropriate amendment of the Constitution.

Lobregat: I would like to request that Dean Magallona’s 30 page position paper, along with the other position papers be reproduced immediately so we can study them as we go along.

Request granted.

Villacorta: I support the BBL. BBL reflects the peace imperative in our country & promises to bring sustained growth in Mindanao. We are talking about redressing and compensating for the years of injustices suffered by our Muslim brothers and sisters. We've caught the attention of ASEAN; we’d like to see them respect the regional autonomy of Mindanao.

Romero: I’d like to disagree that the ARMM is a failed experiment. It is moving forward, and it is our wish that the experiment be expanded. My first concern as a political economist is that I am bothered by the vertical approach. The language of the BBL is vague. I recall the Cataluna secessionist movements. The secessionist regions were among the richest in the country. This is not the case of the ARMM, which is among the poorest regions of the Philippines. They require the support of the country. Another concern is the likelihood of single party governance. It would be lucky if they have a Lee Kwan Yu; otherwise, it would be one of the worst things that could happen. In terms of consultations, it has not been properly done. Some Lumads have been liquidated. What happened to the Sultanates in Sabah? It is not being mentioned here. How big is the defense force? Is it a domestic or international matter? Can the Bangsamoro be able to cope with threats? If the Bangsamoro breakaway, they’ll have a formidable force. The problem in Mindanao is economic. The failure is caused by the irresponsibility of the leadership. We should use ARMM as a template. We should leave the issue of defense to the central government.

Camlian: We are learning from Italy and Germany. There is no threat of a single party dominance.

Lanto: The BBL presents a unique historical case. I have written an article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer about this. Many of the critics of the BBL see the Bangsamoro government to operate as a sub-state, the BBL as a prelude to secession, the possible dismemberment of the republic. That it is unconstitutional. But we must see the Constitution as a living document. *cites preamble and portions of the Constitution on social justice* The reason of the law is the life of the law. This is a political solution to a political problem.

Vergara: On behalf of Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, we would like express our concern over the BBL. Firstly, we feel that the BBL diminishes the power of the Ombudsman, as unlike in the BBL, the Ombudsman is only vested with power to investigate. He BBL should not be allowed to rise above the Constitution as the law of the land. Secondly, we propose that the term of office for public officials be limited to 3 years as with the other officials. Thirdly, the salaries should be determined by the Central Government. Fourthly, the Bangsamoro officials should also be required to declare their SALNs. Lastly, on Article 9, Section 7, the Bangsamoro HRC powers should only be limited to that which is provided in the Constitution.

Indar: *shows presentation on observations on BBL* Art. 2, Sec. 1 is a physical impossibility. The recognition of the Bangsamoro is already in law (e.g. Phil. Bill 1902, RA 6732, RA 9054). What we ask for is continued recognition. Art. 5, Sec. 2 is onerous to all stakeholders. We would like to clarify if simultaneous membership is viable. Also, on the question of auditing, there are two distinct bodies; which will prevail should there be conflict? We propose that amendments be made on the qualifications of the persons composing the commission. On Art. 7, Sec. 4, there seems to be a miscomputation, taking into account the number of districts. On Sec. 9 regarding the Electoral Code, we question whether one year is sufficient for the BTA to draft the code. Sec. 28, we believe that the Chief Minister should at least be 30-35 years old. On Art. 8, can there be a woman Wali? We also note that in Art. 9, Sec. 1, the rights enumerated are already enjoyed by the Bangsamoro people. Sec. 5 of the said article, however, lacks enforceability. On Sharia Justice, we need to reconcile the Sharia with the prohibitions against cruel and undue punishment. The Sharia courts still need to be under the administration of the Supreme Court. On the tribal justice systems, we need to determine the qualifications of those who will sit in its courts. For the block grant, we should increase it from 8% to 10%. In the BTA, it should state the basis of the conferment of authority on the MILF.

Gatdula: The constitutionality of the BBL is tied to the constitutionality of the CAB. The BBL does not address the problems of the Moros. The BBL cannot amend the CAB. The government agreeing to the CAB made it look as if it were an international instrument, which cannot be thwarted by local laws. Reading into the context of the CAB, the CAB creates statehood. It has all the elements— territory, sovereignty, people, government. It even has the powers of government (e.g. taxation, eminent domain, foreign affairs). We use the term “right to self-determination” too loosely. In my readings, self-determination is usually tied up with secession. There are two theories in reading the constitution— the “Living Constitution” theory, and the “Originalist” reading. If it were meant to be a living constution, why have a Constitution in the first place?

Cerilles: I am opposing the BBL as it may affect Zamboanga del Sur especially concerning the issue territorial waters. On Art. 10, Sec. 15, is the Bangsamoro territory an autonomous region? Would it include other regions? If it is an autonomous region, why replace the ARMM?

Gatdula: I have a similar concern. If it is an autonomous region, it should be dealt with by the DILG, like the other local governments. But why does this matter involve the DFA? Why is this foreign affairs issue?

Jajure: Yes, it is an autonomous region under the Constitution. It will not include areas not in the core territory. There are requirements that need to be met for contiguous areas. There is a difference between the Bangsamoro as an identity and the Bangsamoro as a territory. The ARMM does not work; hence, we’re changing its characteristics.

Cerilles: Is there a possibility that other regions can join?

Camlian: If they decide to join, yes.

Cerilles: I’m not satisfied with the answers.

Cerilles: Regarding Art. 11 Sec. 22, why should the Bangsamoro police be given more power? It is not in the Constitution. Will it not create conflicts in jurisdiction regarding arrests, search and seizure?

Jajure: The Bangsamoro police is still part of the National Police and is subject to its rules. The Bangsamoro just has responsibility over them because they are closer.

De Lima: There will be no conflict as the warrant of arrest is enforceable all over the country regardless of the place where it is issued.

Cerilles: This is still unclear to me. I’m not satisfied with the answer.

Cerilles: The proposed BBL is a product of the GPH-MILF negotiations. Before, there were also negotiations with the MNL. What really is the valid reason for giving them more power? And why only specific portions of Mindanao? Is it disintegrating Mindanao? What happens when there’s a failure of elections?

Camlian: Even the Supreme Court ruled that the ARMM was a mere administrative unit. There was no true autonomy.

Sema: *after Camlian explained why he left the MNNLF* We should not put the blame on others. I am of the opinion that the ARMM was not a failed experiment. Let’s stick to the issue at hand. Let’s avoid negating the achievements of others.

Cerilles: On Art. 3, Sec. 2, par. D., Who are these majority voters? Do they include the barangays? Municipalities? Mother province? Why not all of the people in Mindanao? Is there a possibility that all of the people in Mindanao be part of the Bangsamoro? Because to me, it seems like the manner of voting is being done by piece meal. What assurance can you give us that the plebiscite will be fair?

Kinoc: The MILF in the negotiations were being inclusive. The plebiscite will come in two sets. The first plebiscite will take place before the passage of this law. The second plebiscite which refers to those adjacent to the core territory and this will take place any time after the bill is passed.   The initiative will have to come from these adjacent territories. It will be the COMELEC who will conduct these plebiscites and we assume that the COMELEC is fair.

*There was a question about the possibility of Palawan being included in the Bangsamoro territory. One of the BTC members said yes. This caused reactions among the members of the House.*

Oaminal: This issue seems to always cause confusion. Before an area can become part of the Bangsamoro territory, it must first fulfill the criteria, namely, it must be contiguous to the core territory, and it must fulfill the 10% vote for the plebiscite. If the area is far away or not contiguous, even if gains more than the 10% requirement in a plebiscite, it can never be part of the Bangsamoro territory. Let us make that clear.

Cerilles: Art. 5, Sec. 3, par. 13 on the Banking System. What is the extent of the promotion of the BSP do you have in mind? Does this not promote sectarianism? Does this not violate the separation of Church and State? Does this not violate the equal protection clause?

Jajure: The banks are still subject to BSP but in view of the concept of autonomy.

Romero: I am against this. There is no way to determine trade. I’m against barter-trade.

De Lima: Banking is primarily secular. Thus it does not violate the separation of Church and State because it is a secular activity but in due respect to Muslim beliefs (e.g. they may not be amenable to usury)

Sultanate: The Constitution provides for the non-impairment of contracts. Doesn’t this BBL become an abrogation of the Tripoli agreement?

Rodriguez: The non-impairment of contracts primarily refers to private contracts; not executive agreements.

Sultanate: The BBL does not benefit the entire country. Why only portions of Mindanao get to join the plebiscite? Why not hold a plebiscite for the entire country? The BBL is a bad precedent; it is a dismemberment of the country.

De Lima: A plebiscite for the entire country defeats the purpose of ratification as it is for those affected by the bill. We cannot impose on the will of the people affected.

Sultanate: It is also Sabah which will be affected. If Mindanao secedes from the Philippines, we will lose our only link to the claim. The Philippines should pursue its claim to Sabah.

Rodriguez: Sabah is a separate issue. It should be tackled in a different forum.

Cerilles: Is the Bangsamoro a sub-state?

Ferrer: No.

Rodriguez: What is the relationship between the Sharia Justice System and our Justice System?

De Lima: As long as the Supreme Court remains intact, as long as it is not ousted of its powers provided in the Constitution and it maintains administrative supervision over the Sharia courts, the BBL is constitutional. There is a catch-all provision in Art. 13, Sec. 15 on “other matters”. Can the Bangsamoro enact criminal laws? Yes, as long as it conforms to existing national laws.

Lanto: Earlier it was asked what are the other possible crimes that can be penalized when existing national laws have almost everything covered. I can think of the desecration of the Koran, eating of pork in public during the fasting season, restaurants serving pork during these seasons.

Rodriguez: Can they increase the penalty?

De Lima: That is debatable. The Supreme Court will have to decide on that one. But what is important is that we are empowering the Bangsamoro parliament.

Rodriguez: There is a provision in the BBL that states that all decisions are final and executory. Does that not divest the Supreme Court of its powers?

De Lima: That is not a problem. It does not divest the Supreme Court of its powers of judicial review. Many of our laws have the same provision; like the Labor Code states that the decisions of the NLRC are final and executory. But that does not stop the Supreme Court from reviewing the decisions through certiorari.

Benito: The Sharia does not decide on major criminal cases. It does not decide on cases whose penalty exceeds 6 years.

Jajure: BBL allows for more than 6 years.

Rodriguez: This needs to be clarified.

Camlian: On the issue of surrender of firearms, there’s no surrender but a decommissioning. This is similar to the Good Friday agreement.

Romero: Is there a timeframe for decommissioning?

Rodriguez: There was no time frame in Good Friday.

Ferrer: There is a timeframe. The target is 2 months after the signing of the exit agreement. It’s in the annex on the normalization.

Lobregat: There is no mention of it in the BBL. The annex is not the BBL.   A target is different from a schedule.

Lobregat: Has Father Bernas been invited? We need to shed light on the bearing of the intention of a law. We need to know the weight of the intent of the BTC. I have with me the position paper of PHILCONSA. *reads PHILCONSA position paper, gist of which is BBL not consistent with the Constitution* Are our hands in Congress tied? FAB shall be consistent with the agreements of the parties. Is there really a meeting of the minds?

Rodriguez: The power of Congress is plenary, irrespective of what is agreed upon. We are duty bound to craft what is constitutional.

Lobregat: Will the MILF accept?

Camlian: We respect the plenary power of the Congress. That is why we are here.

Dela Cruz: Can we have a comparative analysis of the various agreements, i.e., ARMM Law, MOA-AD, FAB, CAB, BBL?

Rodriguez: Granted.

Lobregat: Will the BBL be consistent with national laws? The BBL has a repealing clause. Will this amend the NIPAS? The IPRA? The Supreme Court ruled that the MOA-AD does not comply with the Constitution due to a provision similar to this.

De Lima: That is the work of the Congress, to make sure that the spirit and letter of the BBL is in line with the Constitution. Art. 10 Sec. 17 authorizes the conferment of powers to the national government. The CAB says the BBL must be consistent with the agreements but it does not say it must reproduce what is in the agreements. It only means that Congress must be in good faith when drafting the law.

Lobregat: Dean Magallona has mentioned that determining the powers belonging to the national government is for the constitutional commission to decide.

De Lima: Most powers are reserved. Some are concurrent. For the concurrent powers, are we divesting the national government of such powers? We are not transferring these powers to the autonomous reserved. As to who determines which powers are reserved, it is the Constitution that determines. We are bound to give respect to the intention of the framers, but this is not absolutely binding. They are merely persuasive. The Ombudsman is not ousted of its mandate to investigate, etc. It is just that the Bangsamoro has the primary disciplinary authority over its officials. This is the same with every other agency. For example, the DOJ has the primary authority to discipline its officials before the matter is raised to the Ombudsman.

Biazon: Answer the questions categorically for the record. Is the BBL intended to be different from RA 9054?

Biazon: Is it a new law?

Biazon: Will it require a new plebiscite? Will those who refused to join the ARMM before be allowed to join the plebiscite?

Ferrer: Yes.

Ferrer: Yes.

Ferrer: Yes.

Alejano: The matter on the plebiscite is not clear to everyone. In a DND meeting, one of the generals remarked that those who voted no to the ARMM before are not part of the plebiscite. This information, according to the general, came from OPAPP. That is why I’ve been repeatedly asking OPAPP for the stratcomm.

Alejano: Is there a timeline for the dismantling of firearms? And what is to be done with the private armed groups (PAGs)?

Ferrer: We’re working with the cabinet security cluster on coming up with a directive on loose firearms and PAGs. We have independent monitoring and decommission.

Alejano: I’m worried about Malaysia being a facilitator. We have a standing claim to Sabah. Is this a sort of quid pro quo agreement regarding Sabah? I believe there is a conflict of interest. Malaysia supports conflict in Mindanao.

Romero: My sources confirm that sentiment.

Gatdula: Malaysia facilitating internationalizes the agreement. Although there are two kinds of self-determination (internal and external), the term usually ends up in secession. Also, this asymmetrical arrangement, I’ve never heard of such a thing before. It sounds more to me like a state.

Rodriguez: It is not a sub-state.

Villacorta: It is not a state because the Bangsamoro does not claim sovereignty. The right to self-determination refers to internal self-determination meaning self-rule, recognition and advancement of culture, heritage, etc. The BBL is a special case. We cannot be too legalistic. It is an initiative to redress the past. We confront it in the present. Otherwise, what is the future for our children and grandchildren? We must learn to dream, and we must learn to trust. Personally, I think those who are against the BBL are those with personal vested interests in its non-passing.

Lobregat: I disagree with the part on the vested interest. *We are for peace spiel*

Sultanate: How will the BBL be implemented? How will this affect the 1996 Final Peace Agreement? We should press Malaysia on the Sabah matters! The BBL is not inclusive for everyone. We should learn from the experience of Sierra Leone.

Ferrer: The BBL does not abrogate the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. We’re building on that. Sabah was not a matter on our peace table. Everyone was consulted.

Sultanate: We are the legitimate heirs of the sultanate. We were not consulted.

Alejano: We should know the culture. Even if the lines are open, people will not come unless they are intentionally invited. Hence, OPAPP should have a stratcomm.